Ken writes: I suppose this post will be a little opaque to people who haven’t treated themselves to ‘Into Thin Air’ and ‘The Climb’ (or any of the pages and pages available online related to this issue), …but I am going to say what I think is the source of the antagonism between John Krakauer and Anatoli Boukreev. For my part I didn’t really feel that ‘Into Thin Air’ portrayed Boukreev (B) in such a bad light, but we know that B was sufficiently hurt to want to set the record straight. We also know, from the appendices to ‘The Climb’ in which some of these arguments are detailed that Krakauer (K) pretty adamantly stuck to his account in the face of attempts to correct him. So what’s the story? I think that K feels that even if he’s wrong about particular matters of detail, still his account gets to the heart of the matter, that is, that it reflects a basic truth of the extent of B’s culpability. K accepts his own part in the tragedy. He agonises over the part he played in misreporting what happened to Andy Harris, and about his inability to help the other climbers in his party after he had made it down to the South Col. But from K’s perspective, B was insufficiently remorseful. He didn’t accept that the outcome might have been better if he had acted differently.
So what is the case against B? K doesn’t make the point that B didn’t take Beck Weathers down off the mountain, but that showed a real lack of initiative. This is something that emerges not in ‘Into Thin Air’ but in ‘The Climb.’ B met Beck on the way down, and saw that he needed to be taken down, but he thought he saw another guide, and so left it to them to take him down. Beck was already snow blind and in a bad way and had already spent 8 hours alone. If B was going down, he should have taken Beck with him. One of the things that emerges from both accounts is how differently things might have turned out if the climbers had had a little more time. After B had descended to the South Col, Neal Beidleman was guiding the ‘Mountain Madness’ climbers down and he ‘picked up’ Mike Groom with Beck Weathers and Yasuko Namba on the way. But because it was a big group, we’re told, and because he was having to hold on to Yasuko Namba (while Mike guided Beck), he wasn’t able to lead the group from the front and with no clear leader people walked in the direction that seemed right to them. When they reached the bottom of the fixed ropes above camp four they could still just see the lights of the camp, but then it got dark and without a leader to follow they ended up walking away from the camp and nearly off a cliff. If B had been present guiding the group down with Beidleman and Groom, they would have been able to move a bit faster, and they would have been able to stay on course for the camp. That would have saved Namba’s life.
B argued it had always been Scott Fischer’s plan that B would descend quickly to be ready at camp 4 in case anything should go wrong. But surely it is OK to change the plan to deal with the particular conditions. On the day of the ascent, B going down met Scott Fischer coming up, and K makes a lot of B apparently telling Fischer that he was going down (as opposed to Fischer sending B down). But whether there was a plan or not, B should have told Fischer not to carry on up but should have gone back up himself to round up the Mountain Madness clients with Beidleman instead of descending. Whatever the plan was, he should have used his initiative and judged that Scott Fischer was in no state to proceed to the summit.
In summary: The problem with B, is that he had a preconceived notion of what being a guide demanded; a notion he rigidly conformed to as a guide on the 1996 expedition, but one he willingly gave up when guiding an Indonesian team to the summit the next year (Then, three clients attempted the summit and were inidividually managed by three guides). He didn’t change his conception of where his job ended in light of the events on the mountain and as a result, and Scott Fischer and Neal Beidleman ended up taking up the slack between them. It killed Scott. The case against B then is that he was a jobsworth to a cupable degree.
But, having said all that, I think it’s not so hard to understand why B had the attitudes he did. His command of English at the time was really pretty weak, and it is tiring to interact with people in your second language, and particular to discuss important decisions like who should be responsible for what part of the expedition. It’s really much simpler then just to stick to the plan. And, really, the main factors contributing to the disaster on Everest in 1996 were the lack of radios among all the guides, but most seriously, Rob Hall’s decision not to turn climbers back from the attempt at the summit when the agreed deadline past.
Jon disliked Anatoli because Anatoli made him hurtfully aware of his weakness on the mountain that night.
you are correct Tammy
i can say that I am A “arm chair” mountaineer but i have read 3 books on Boukreev, my support means absolutely nothing but there is a man by the name of Ed Veistures(Greatest American Alpinist) that calls Boukreev the quentisential mountaineer, and there are proven facts that he has improved Neil Beidlmans quality of life and set some of the greatest records in the history of mountaineering, I apoligize if I misspelled some words but the reason why I am responding to this site is because I think that our heroes are of the innappropriate breed. I believe that by listening to the thoughts of Toyla and his acheivements are far greater than obsession of celeb life. What happened to truely great heros like Boukreev? Are they still out there? Or have all the Peaks been climbed to the best of there ability? I personally believe that if a man that believed in fate like Anotoli believed, the only thing he would hope for was the strength of his Capatalist nation to recover from the poverty that took his climbing career to the brink of complete elimanation.
Well said…
Jon is a journalist. He wants to tell a story. Whether it is the truth or his perception of what is the truth makes us all react so strongly. Personally, I think Jon interjected his perception not what really was going on. Why? It makes a better story? It relieves him of his helplessness of not having helped others in his group who died? It gave a living human face to the tragedy since the leaders were both dead and it was too painful to blame them. Read Anatoli’s “The Climb” and it’s easy to see Jon wrote from his perception not reality. Anitoli worked for a different group and Jon makes very convincing wild assumptions that made him, Jon, feel better about what happened. A little survival guilt may play into this as well.. Read “The Climb” and learn Anitoli doesn’t use supplemental oxygen because “if you don’t use it, you don’t run out of it”. Anatoli acclimates by working with the sherpas to prepare the trails at high altitude and doesn’t have a problem with his strength, endurance or thinking while climbing. Others did not acclimate or train as hard, or have the same physiological integrity so they needed extra oxygen. Running out of supplemental oxygen is always a problem on trips when time limits to turn around or bottle necks occur with too many people climbing the same day requiring longer times out at high altitude. It is human error that creates the problem. Interesting, climbing permits are given to many groups in a single season to climb Everest. There is no limit to how many groups or number of people can summit the same day using the same trails and ropes. Larger groups of people climbing the same day makes for hazardous conditions. The government providing permits only wants money to be on their turf. They don’t make rules about safety. They show no interest in making rulings about garbage, sanitary conditions or child labor. It’s up to the visitors to leave no trace behind and travel safely.
I TOTALLY AGREE THAT JON HAD IT WRONG AND THERE WAS A BIT OF ENVY AND WEAKNESS IN HIS DEFENCE OF HIS REACTION TO A SITUATION THAT ANATOLI RESPONDED TO. NAMELY HE WALKED AWAY FROM WEATHERS WITHOUT REACTION WHEREAS ANATOLI REALISED THAT ANOTHER SHERPA WAS THERE TO HELP WEATHERS. MY OPINION IS JON’S ENVY OF A REMARKABLE MAN AND HIS DETERMINATION TO DESTROY THIS IMAGE WHILST ADDING TO HIS OWN LACK OF COURAGE AND TRUTH. I.E. ANATOLI’S GEAR AT THE SUMMIT. WHAT A NIT PICKER. AMONGST PEOPLE IN ABSOLUTE DISTRESS – WHO DID JON HELP????
A lot of other famous mountaineers have pointed out how irresponsible it is to guide without gas in the Death Zone. That was the main point Krakauer was pointing out. The “If you don’t use it, you don’t run out” is a total weak arguement. Of course you stay warmer longer, etc. etc with gas. I’ll take the guy who takes the blame for his actions over the guy who doesn’t. Even if in this case the guy was the great mountaineer, Boukreev.
I like what you said. I read both books years ago and know someone who was on the trip. He survived and helped “toli” write the book the Climb. He believes that krakaur’s book tried to discredit his friend “toli” and upset him to the point that he went to climb, annapurna, i think it was, alone and during avalanche time. i suppose you know he died. My friend hates Krakaur for destroying his friend. And now I read that krakaur is doing the same thing to Greg Mortenson. What a jerk. I will never read a book by him.
@sue
> He believes that krakaur’s book tried to discredit his friend “toli”
> and upset him to the point that he went to climb, annapurna, i think
> it was, alone and during avalanche time. i suppose you know he died.
This is a joke, right? Boukrev went and climbed Lhotse solo immediately after the 96 Everest disaster as a reaction to those events. I believe that climb set a speed record for that summit.
He died on Annapurna in 97 while climbing with Simone Moro. Yes, it was an aggressive attempt in winter, but that’s what he did; he was a mountain climber. To attribute Anatoli Boukrev’s death to his reaction to what Jon Krakauer said in “Into Thin Air” is piling it pretty high. Saying he died on a solo attempt is a straight out lie.
@Sue: I know it’s none of my business but I think one shouldn’t say that one will never read a book by someone if one is going to criticize the person. You don’t have to buy a book or a magazine to read it. They are usually available for free at the library and sometimes even online.
@Doug: Calling Sue out for ‘lying’ is a bit extreme when it is obvious that she is relating something someone else told her (and made that condition quite clear in her writing). Cool it.
Marcia, you are right on! Many thanks for your incisive and accurate analysis. K was there to right a story and was safely back in his tent. Had Anatoli chosen to do what K did there would have been more casualties. Anatoli, the lion-heart, ventured back out and up the mountain and guided descending climbers to safety; there were no client causalities in the group Anatoli was guiding. I will give this to K – he is a slick story teller. To those who seek true facts I urge they separate perceptions from reality.
Interestingly, what I have not seen discussed ever is where the 15+ sherpas in the Hall and Fischer teams were situated on the mountain when the tragedy was unfolding. They could and should have played a critical role in saving lives.
From reading all the different books I can only say that Anatoli Boukreev is a hero you nowadays rarely find. And I agree with Tammy, since there is no other plausible answer to the question, why Jon Krakauer behaved so unfair towards one of the greatest mountain climbers. I am too old to climb the Himalayas today, but if I would have had the chance in the eighties or nineties, as a leader I would definitely have chosen Anatoli.
I agree with you . Jon K is Journalist “PIMP” Writing what people like to hear. Pour soul was sleeping in tent when Anatoli was working his ass off. No respect for JK.
Pavel Klimsa
Very true. It’s been a long time since I read both books but I remember thinking how K seemed to dismiss lost opportunities he could have taken, prefer is prob not the appropriate word but B’s account seems to give a less glossed over account so I ‘prefer’ anatolis book. Both great books of a tragic event though.
Much better Book The Summit from Anatoli Boukrev then Jon K.
Nice done to see what High altitude Clmbers love to do.
tammy Jon doesnt DISLIKE Anatoli (who is dead now) He slmply pointed outthe weaknes in the plan that Anatolis team had in GUIDEING their clientstothe top of Everest and getting them back alive. I have been an International mountain guide for twenty two years now and have guided people 100 per cent SAFELY to around 20,000 feet over sixty times now and can tell you a real guide will NEVER go down ahead of his clients, a real guide will NEVER allow the window of time to close and still allow clients to CONTINUE up, a real guide will NEVER pass clients on the way down when the allotted time is up, and a real guide on Everest will NEVER climb Everest or any other 800 meter peak without oxygen and try to say they will be fit enough to make rational decions or physically take dcare without adequte oqygen to their brain. In short Jon on criticized anotoli from a GUIDING standpoint. He did his job poorly. Although it was not clearly enough defined for him and he is not a real guide, just a superb climber. I totally respect his accomplishments but I deplore his unprofessional guiding techniques and the plans they had for their clients. Anatoli was theere on that expeditino purely for the ake of money combined withthe opportunity to to acclimate himself for his next clmb.. Lhotse. HE tiedto combine the two interests and the guiding part tok second seat to the prep for the upcoming climb. Jon’s review and criticism were TOTALLY valid and justified considering a guide’s FIRST and FORMOST job is to KEEP CLIENTS SAFE. thisis harder and requires complete DILIGENCE at 800 meters. IN fact , We know that guiding at this altitudereuqures a one to one guide ratio to be in the SAFE REALM. I know Jon and he’d be the first to say he is not in the league of climber that Anatoli is. And he certainly isnt jealous of Anatolis accomplisment. If Anatoli had done his job on the mountain higher up, the group huddle would never have happened because they ould not have been that late comgin down. Any of the guides beside Anatoli also share in this blunder.
They should have herded EVERYONE down when it was nearing the time of 1 pm or 2 pm whichever their turnaround time was previously agreed upon or perhaps earlier since it took solong to get everyon thru the hillery step becaue of peope not doing their job of setting fixed lines befoe they arrived there , thereby using and huge amount s of time to get through that section.
Jon is not a world class climber. However hes a better alpine and all around climber record than most at that time. He was very fit, and one of the few who was actually in shape enough and experienced enough to be a suitable client to climb Everest. I know that for a fact. HIs a climber him. thats not unreasonable when you are tired , at altitude and people are wearing the same color down jackets and gear when winds blowing and you are not roped to them. Ive someitmes mistaken who my clients were even when they were roped to me simply beacues of their similar outfits were the same color.
ps Sorry for the typos I’m a guide and my typing skills are poor at best. I hope you get the messge, even thogh my typing sucks heheI have very stong feelings forthis episode and how people view it knowing Jon, and having spent time talking with Rob Hall on several occasions in 94, and most of all from guiding peope successfully for so many years. After the accident, I as approached by the media in Denver TV to interview about this accident which i declined because i saw them as buzzards tryingto feed on peoples demise and passing. I HATE that. I declined offers from many friend to attendthe Imax showing because of the morbid curiosity and armchair critiques aslwell as lack of exereience many had in the high altitude giding world. I had been askedto go ont he 94 K@ expedition which Rob Hall was considering doing. Thats why i talked him about K2. I didnt like the lack of experienced base camp management and removed myself from the team a few months beforethetrip was scheduled to leave.
Rob alos dropped out and wnt to Everest again I belive to guide a goup? I cant remember now.Another aquiantance of mine, Steve Untch was on that expedition and he was killed while rescuing another member . And Michael Groom was there too. although I never spoke with Michael personally. In fact I think he took my spot after i dropped out if my memory serves me. Feel free to contact me and ask what you ike, but lets not point fingers at Jon. He expected a guided trip to be operating at a safer level than they did. Anatoli’s speed clmbing is a world away fromwhat he was supposed to be doing on this trip.
he was supposed to be a guide on this particular event. Having siad this we hav learned a great deal fomr this tragedy. Guided clmibs on Everest are done in a much much safe mode nowadays with a one to one guide /climber ratio,. and radios for all the guides and up todate weather reports that are good for every passing 6 hours.
Its with great satisfaction that I see improvements in guiding in this region, even when so many client of various abilities are opening up their wallets. The are weeded out eventually and still can be brought safely down the vast majority of the time because of added manpower, increased accuracy of weather reports and adherance to them, and
a one to one guide/client ratio.
“I have been an International mountain guide for twenty two years now and have guided people 100 per cent SAFELY to around 20,000 feet over sixty times now and can tell you a real guide will NEVER go down ahead of his clients, a real guide will NEVER allow the window of time to close and still allow clients to CONTINUE up, a real guide will NEVER pass clients on the way down when the allotted time is up, and a real guide on Everest will NEVER climb Everest or any other 800 meter peak without oxygen and try to say they will be fit enough to make rational decions or physically take dcare without adequte oqygen to their brain…” (blah, blah, blah)…
Just because you claim to be a guide and clearly aren’t dead yet doesn’t make you the universal arbiter of who’s a ‘real guide’ and who isn’t. I’m actually surprised that any ‘real’ high altitude climbing guide who’s been working for more than a week would still have this amount of black and white guiding philosophy left… and so much willingness to public claim that this and that colleague should ‘never’ do such and such thing. There’s a reason why one rarely hear a professional in any profession saying such things like this about colleagues in public… because they know better from real experience (rather than an armchair one) than to be so certain about what other people should do in their situation.
Having read all of these books, it seems to me that the 8,000 meter plus guide profession was in its infancy in 1996 and that you can’t judge what happened in 1996 by 2012 standards. People learned from the mistakes in 1996. But the real cuprit is Scott Fisher. It seems to me that Bourkeev had permission to do what he did and that Scott Fisher made an error in judgment in allowing him to do it.
dude,
you totally lack credibility
you substituted Krackauer’s name with a K
and Boukreev’s name with a B.
Are you lazy?
you sound like you need a baby-sitter or a butler,
not a mountain guide.
Who is going to admit they are lazy? My boss probably thinks so. I could probably do a bit more work around the house. Yes I abbreviated their names, but I don’t see how that affects the substance of my post. You misspelled one of them. You don’t capitalise words appropriately, but I don’t think that affects things either. I am a keen hill-walker, but I don’t pretend to be a mountaineer. I don’t think I need to be to have a view about the events on that mountain. I try to hazard a guess at what might drive the antipathy between Krakauer and Broukreev. That’s more a question about human psychology than anything else. Broukreev’s failings on the mountain were not failings of mountaineering but a failure of guiding and a failure to play a part of a team. I will only ever experience the highest mountains vicariously, but people who go there guiding others should expect their actions to be subject to the scrutiny, and occasionally, the opprobrium, of people who weren’t there.
Boukreevs failings were only a failure of communication(his lack of english). He is by far the greatest speed climber of our generation, his dedication to fitness and his depth of humanity cant be understood by people who have never pushed themselves to be great. My efforts in running were of no consequence until he inspired me to be a better man. 4 miles turned into 8 or 9, I will not forget the way he looked at a sunset or a rise, the only thing that i will remember is that he was at peace at these times on the mountain. Boukreev has inspired me to be a better man, as far as Krakuer? well I have to say that he is not the man i think of when I need inspiration. Thanx Toyla, its between u and Prefontaine; you r both the reason why i run 30 miles a week. JD
sorry
I am actually in the process of doing an online piece about this same debate that has been drawn out over the last ten years.
It’s not so much that Krakauer is wrong or that Boukreev was wrong, but that the latter did act heroically in the end, and that Krakauer wasn’t experienced enough to question his actions. In the aftermath, some have decided that by questioning his (Krakauer) character and motives, then it may absolve Boukreev of any wrongdoing.
Here’s what I see as the biggest difference (and I am by no means finished with the research):
Boukreev did act heroically, which Krakauer never once disputed, but the fact that his judgement on that day was called into question by an amateur, in regards to high altitude climbing, serves as a rallying cry to rebel against the system- the neophytes who pay big bucks to climb the highest peaks for their trophy case. In some ways, it is a belief that these corperates use the climb to coopt Mt. Everest to their own desires and uses.
Boukreev, on the other hand, was a true mountaineer, and one of the greatest of his day, and for Krakauer to question his judgement, is ridiculous; at least to those who defend Dewalt’s account of Boukreev’s actions. They feel that Krakauer was using the whole event for monetary gains.
What those who try to discredit Krakauer fail to recognize was that he never places responsibility for the disaster solely on one person. He is equally critical of his own actions, and in the end, really wasn’t that critical of Boukreev, at least in the book form, other than to say that a lot of people made bad decisions on that day.
In the end, as far as I can so far tell, the debate should’ve ended on May 11, 1996. Whether Scott Fisher intended for Boukreev to descend on his own, without bottled oxygen, and ahead of their clients is irrelevent. In this particular instance, it was an irresponsible one. However, it would not have prevented the disaster that took place, and from all that I’ve read, I have yet to find one example of Krakauer specifically blaming Boukreev for it.
In the end, it seems to be the oldest debate known to man: the fight against the system, and those who rebel equate Krakauer to part of that system, which is unfair.
“In the end, as far as I can so far tell, the debate should’ve ended on May 11, 1996.”
Is in the end of your post which begins :
“I am actually in the process of doing an online piece about this same debate that has been drawn out over the last ten years.”
That’s good stuff.
Thanks for the comment! I’d love to read your online piece when it comes out.
Anatoli Boukreev is mountain legend,what he did that night was heroic and nobel act, but that still doesn’t explain his ascent as guide without rucksack, no excuse for that. I guess that at the time he didn’t quite undrestud his job which is in many way’s as baby sitting.
Any way I admire that men.
R.I.P. Anatoli Boukreev
I just finished reading Into Thin Air and also The Climb. I felt Krakauer was extremely harsh concerning Boukreev’s choices on the mountain. This was a true heroic climber who pursued climbing out of pure joy and lovc of the sport….whereas Krakauer felt the reason for climbing at high altitude was to endure pure pain. But the reality is that you only feel that pain if you are not qualified to climb at high altitude. Krakauer may have had a personality conflict with Boukreev, because I feel Krakauer went out of his way to denigrate Boukreev’s choices without finding out the full truth for his choices. Krakauer also did not give an appropriate biography of Boukreev as he did of others on this climb. I am shocked that to this day Krakauer has not written an additional afterword to Into Thin Air to admit the omissions he made. Boukreev saved Sandy Pittman’s life and she never has confirmed that because of her huge ego and hubris. Boukreev was properly attired for the climb…..and on and on.
I would like to know what others think who have read both these books….thank you
I read first Anatoli’s book several years ago, and I was really moved for all the story.
Now I have just finished reading Jon’s book, and altough it is very well writtened, I can not help but think that Krakaueris totally unfair with Boukreev, i don’t know for wath reasom: Jealousy?, envy?
The sad history of this is that most of the people has read only one side of the story ,that is Jon’s.
First , Krakouer is desperatelly looking for bottles of gas while descending.
It is clear that it meant the only way to survive for most of the people up there. Anatoli describes in his book that here was a sortage of this botlles in the ascent. And he was aware that if he was used to it, and then he couldn’t get more, that would be a big trouble. So it was better to climb with out suplementary oxygen, and use it only if it was really necesary. With the advantage that his clients could breath the bottles that he wouln’t use. I’m attonished that Krakauer saw this as a wrong thing.
As well as how Anatoli, thinking in advance, preserved all his power just in case it will be needed, as it happened.
Under my point of view, it is not enough well descripted the suprem effort that Bukreev had to develop that night to get off the tent in the middle of the hurricane, after summit the Everest, and search and rescue that three people.
Why he did it, when nobody else could even just be awake, complitly exhausted ? This has no fairly highlited as it should.
Jon later said that the following morning some Sherpas attempted to climba lot of feets searching for the leaders, as this was heroic too, but in not point is the same like Anatoly did.
He was powerfull, and what is most important, very clever.
It’s really sad that some bestsellers writters can depict the good reputation of really big people.
Anyway, the climbing world has given all support to Anatoly, and I don’t think we’ll share Jon work or ideas.
I read Krakauer’s book.
Later, I mentioned it to Matt, a guide for EXUM. All he said was: “read ‘The Climb’ “.
My impression is that Boukreev is (was) a real mountaineer.
Krakauer is a journalist.
I ONLY READ THE CLIMB AND VARIOUS OPINIONS OF ANATOLI. FROM HIS C.V. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT JON WAS ENVIOUS OF HIS ABILITY TO DO WHAT JON COULD NOT. THAT IS CLIMB WITHOUT OXYGEN. ALSO JON PASSED WEATHERS AND DID NOT SEE WHETHER THERE WAS A SHERPA TO HELP HIM, WHEREAS ANATOLI MADE SURE THERE WAS SOMEONE TO HELP WEATHERS. AS FOR THE NIT PICKING RE ATTIRE – WELL PHOTOS AND COMMENTS FROM THE DONER SAYS IT ALL. JON IS AN ENVIOUS PERSON AND A LIAR. THAT SAYS IT ALL.
You people need to learn how to read. During his encounter with Weathers on the descent Krakauer did note that a guide (Mike Groom) above was descending and would be in a better position to help Weathers (since Groom had a rope). But Krakauer is pretty blunt in acknowledging that he was glad that Weathers was willing to wait.
All this stuff about Krakauer being jealous of Boukreev is ridiculous. Also, please note that while Krakauer did not have extensive high altitude experience, he did some pretty respectable climbing on his own (2nd ever ascent of Moose’s tooth, Devils Thumb, Cerro Torre) before going to Everest.
Not to mention that Krakauer has no problem praising Boukreev for his actions once the disaster was underway.
FWIW, experienced climbers (Breshears, Viesturs, Messner, et al) are pretty much universal in considering it irresponsible to guide on an 8000 meter peak without supplemental oxygen. Further, a guide climbing without a pack containing emergency gear (including something as simple as a rope).is incomprehensible.
Well I know one thing….. If Rob Hall be alive after ……. Jon Krakauer would sue him or his butt for not returning back from summit 2:00pm ,to get some mighty dolaros,
so he can write another Shit with pointing the fingers to others.
Pavel K
Hi,
Having read Into Thin Air, The Climb and also Lene Gammelgaard’s book which pertains to the 1996 tragedy on Everest, I have a few thoughts to share.
It seems to me that Jon has been absolutely unfair to Toli, a man who many considered as Tiger Woods of high altitude climbing. Jon puts the blame on Toli for a lot many things without having verified the facts from the people who were climbing on the mountain that fateful day.
Toli’s climbing without oxygen was approved by Scot, his early descent down the mountain was infact a part of the plan which was discussed between Scott and the Mountain Madness base camp manager (which was mentioned to Jon by Scott’s BC manager but was omitted by Jon in his acocunt ). That Toli was climbing without proper clothing was proved wrong by his summit day pictures, a copy of which was sent to Jon.
I guess Jon’s intention was to paint Toli as a devil, for reasons best known to him. The fact that Toli’s heorics were recognised by American Alpine Association is ample proof of his contribution in avoiding a greater tragedy on Everest.
Anatoli Boukreev – Not Forgotten
I TOTALLY AGREE WITH YOU. WE HAVE LOST A REMARKABLE MAN AND TO SEE HIM BEING DESTROYED BY A PERSON WHO HAS NEVER HAD THE EXPERIENCE ANATOLI HAD IS OBSENE. GET REAL JON. YOU ARE A COWARD WHO HANGS ONTO COMMENTS THAT COULD MAKE YOU MORE MONEY. THAT’S ABSOLUTELY UNFORGIVABLE.,
Turn off cap lock….
I found your blog via Google while searching for this tool and your post looks very interesting for me. Keep up the good work.
I think the problem is that Jon Krakauer did not have the expertise to judge what was happening on the mountain. He is not, as he freely admits, a high altitude climber, nor was he in in Scott Fischer’s group. Given that, he was in no position to evaluate – and then criticise so devastatingly – Boukreev’s actions. Many of Krakauer’s original criticisms of Boukreev were inaccurate and thus omitted from the book Into This Air, and I think this demonstrates that to a certain extent, Krakauer didn’t really understand what was happening. I think the great pity is that this tragedy (and the memory of a great climber) have been subordinated to this unneccesary controversy. The real point of discussion should be: what are the moral issues around commercial, guided climbs at high altitude?
Boukreev may have shown heroism that night, but it was only after he neglected his primary duty on this climb, to be a guide. He was hired to look out for the other clients on the Mountain Madness team. After reaching the summit himself, he knew that without O2 he needed to descend quickly. He showed selfish disregard for the people he was hired to instruct and even the man whom he was working for. If he would have not been so consumed with personal ambition, he would have used bottled oxygen. This would have enabled him to display his supreme knowledge and expertise unto the people who were paying him for it.
Brian,
From your post it is obvious that you have only read Krakauer’s book, and not Anatoli Boukreev’s response ,”The Climb”, nor his fascinating posthumous memoir “Above The Clouds”.
There is a much broader perspective available to us in these books, along with the accounts by Beck Weathers, Lene Gamelgaard, Ed Viesturs, and David Breshears. With information from these additional sources, it becomes apparent how cultural divides and differing (or amateurish) expectations could led Krakauer to misapprehend Boukreev’s motivations and character.
Krakauer’s book is indeed spellbinding, and it’s the most thorough attempt to examine the disaster. But his relentless criticism of Boukreev in the book as well as in subsequent articles and speaking engagements makes it clear that Krakauer had some personal issue with Anatoli Boukreev. The undisputed fact that Boukreev was the only individual, including Sherpa, who was able and willing to head out onto the south col during the height of the storm to rescue stranded climbers (from another party!) should be enough to drive any curious reader to question why Jon Krakauer chose to paint him as the caustic and irresponsible Russian villain we find in Into Thin Air.
I find it odd that anyone could read ITA and feel that JK’s criticism of AB is “relentless”.
JK criticized AB for (a.) going without bottled oxygen, and (b.) going ahead of his clients, rather than guiding them.
JK praised AB for his heroic acts afterwards.
What exactly was unfair about his criticism? All I see is a large number of people with emotional attachment to a great man, refusing to suffer any criticism of their hero/friend.
Stuart Hutchison also went out onto the South Col to look for the missing climbers. True, he didn’t go far from his tent, but he did make an attempt.
I have read both the books & other comments on 1996 Everest Tragedy. I feel Jon need not have been so critical of Anatoli who was an extraordinary high altitude climber. The tragedy was primarily due to Commercialism & poor Leadership. Both the Team Leaders had no business to have kept climbing beyond the stipulated time.
The Tragedy was repeated in 2006 as no lessons were learnt from 1996 fiasco.
I first read Into Thin Air and had one view of the situation. I have now read the Climb and here is my opinion.
The fact was, Scott Fisher was overwhelmed and not leading the team effectively. Whether this was due to illness we will never know. Mr. Boukreev was probably not the best guide for that group or the situation, but he did probably as he was told. The sherpas weren’t fixing lines, they were all going for the summit instead of waiting at camp iv (except for poor Big Pemba). After reading “the Climb” apparently there were times when Boukreev was down low on the mountian “gaining his strength”, SF was off drinking beers etc. Sf was also climbing up and down the mountian, carting Dale Kruse etc. and getting more tired and not delegating. So the only person really guiding the clients was Biedelman. But it is not Boukreev’s fault, as he wasn’t getting the direction from Fisher, and he was being told to do things like fix lines etc.
But regardless of the mismanagement in the “madness” camp, if Rob Hall hadn’t made his fatal errors things would have been less deadly. Basically the only guide from the Hall team that wasn’t up at the summit dying with Doug Hanson was Mike Groom. So out of pure humanism, the madness team (Beidelman) had to drag Namba and Beck down, and this slowed them down. This group needed an extra guide, and it could have been Boukreev if he hadn’t been down “making tea” at camp IV, but truly it should have been one of the guides from Hall’s team. And Andy Harris had been sick the whole trip so he shouldn’t have been guiding that day, and he really shouldn’t have been up there with Hall and Hanson, AND they should have all been down if they’d turned around at 2 pm. For the madness team, they would have done better if they hadn’t whooped it up for so long on the summit.
In general I do respect Krakauer, but I think it was a little low to criticize Boukreev. It was Fisher’s fault that he wasn’t guiding the way he might be expected to do so, I don’t think he had ever guided this type of trip before. If he had been with the group that got lost during the storm would they have made it back to camp sooner? Who knows. But if they hadn’t, and he had been with them, getting hypothermic and hypoxic, then he wouldn’t have been able to save them, and more would have died.
Mr Boukreev risked his life numerous times, and did save several including S.P. So my opinion is that he was a hero for sure. Just maybe not a great guide.
BTW-does anyone find it curious that Sandy Pittman’s husband Pittman is now married to Brashear’s exwife Veronica and that they got together soon after this?
I feel you have said it best. I agree with you on all accounts. After reading both books twice and watching numerous videos on Youtube about the 1996 disaster I now feel that both parties were to blame. I did read Into Thin Air first and feel that many people who read this book before The Climb seem to favor Kraukaur’s side. I will state that Boukreev refers to Into Think Air often and seems to have written The Climb only as a rebuttle to Kraukaur. With the last part of The Climb being all about his assent with the Indonesian team in 1997, it is obvious that Boukreev is feeling the need to justify his guiding expertise.
I will preface this by saying that it is too terrible that this whole situation happened to begin with, however it did and people are going to thrive on the “whys?” for a long time.
I also agree with Sarah (see above) that Biedleman was really the only guide, “guiding” Mountain Madness with the clients. Yes, Boukreev did do A LOT on the mountain, but prior to the descent, most of it did not deal with clients. And yes, Fisher approved everything for Boukreev.
The bottom line, and I did say this later in this write up, but be real…..Krakauer was a client and Boukreev was a hired guide. Krakauer is a writer and Boukreev lived for the mountains. Krakauer had his point of views and saw Boukreev in his own way. Boukreev did what in his own mind was the best (with Fisher’s approval) and Krakauer did what he was capable of (with Hall’s approval).
The bottom line…….and it sucks……but the only people we can blame, are Fisher and Hall. They were the guides. I do have to agree with something I read, that these two guides were playing “chicken” with each other and it only hurt many others (including themselves) in the long run. Their egos got the best of them.
Krakauer only wrote his experience down. Many have criticized that he wrote Into Thin Air too soon after the disaster. However, Boukreev wrote The Climb only a year after Krakauer.
I am not taking sides, just making some key points on both ends.
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Agreed 100%. JK even said as much in his book.
1) I was not there. But I remember events where I was and the participants couldn’t agree on what had happened.
2) Jon Krakauer states shortly after the events that he KNEW the “plan” between Scott Fischer and Anatoli Boukreev was that the latter would go back down straight after summitting in order to rehydrate and rest so that he would be able to go back up if help was needed. What was not planned is that the expledition leader, Scott Fischer, would be sick, try to summit despite his state and get there too late. Did Boukreev advise him to turn around when their paths crossed? We don’t know.
Did Scott agree with B.’s intention to summit without oxygen and was he informed about this issue aforehand? We don’t know.
3) The expedition leader being sick, there was no leader to guide the clients to the summit. Did Scott Fischer delegate his part and appoint a replacement? We don’t know. Probably not, otherwise one of the hired guides would presumably have taken over.
4) How come an experienced leader like Scoot Fischer hired – to help him with his clients! – a “guide” (who calls himself a “coach”, not a “guide”) whose English is so poor that it was clear from the beginning that there would be problems understanding each other?
5) What exactly was expected from Anatoli Boukreev? Did he ever receive clear instructions from Scott Fischer – before and/or during the trip? He certainly wasn’t paid $ 25’000 to do whatever pleased him, SOMETHING was expected from him. What? Did he meet with these expectations we ignore?
6) Personally, I don’t know Jon Krakauer nor Anatoli Boukreev whose account I haven’t read yet. So I am not trying to defend one or the other.
Compared to other readers I never felt Krakauer was putting a real blame on Boukreev. I understood he was astonished about how freely B. moved, alone, not “caring” for anyone, as it seemed. Later he stated B. made a heroic rescue. Where’s the blame?
7) It seems that Krakauer after coming back from the summit was in no state to undertake whatever action. I can imagine that, but I was not there and even if was there I couldn’t know how he felt. Who could possibly blame somemone in these conditions (exhausted at over 8000 meters after summitting in bad weather) not to be able to stand up and go rescue others? Do those who formulate such strange ideas pretend they know he was not exhausted enough?
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Also very well stated. My thoughts exactly. I think some people are being way too sensitive, and are way overstating what JK actually wrote when they claim he painted AB as a “villain”. The only people I saw portrayed as “villains” in the book were the South African team.
I finished ITA thinking AB was a bit foolhardy (like most extreme climbers are by nature), but extremely skilled and ultimately extremely heroic. Seems like a good way to be portrayed, all in all. Not sure why people are so offended on AB’s behalf.
Did I right? Tolya is a hero of mine, an unreal human that set out only to understand his life and its meaning. A writer from New mexico or wherever krakuer was from never crossed his mind. Dont insult anotolies achievements by letting some sensationailist warp the truth. If it wasnt for Tolya Krakuer may be dead and he knows that. Anotoli was not an expedition leader, he was a guide. he discussed his actions, and although his leader(Scott Fischer) was not of the right mind, Tolya made decisions that saved alot of lives. I feel humbled by the actions that Anatoli made in his career, I only wish I could be 1/4 the person he is. Thanx for inspiring my life Anotoli,
John Devine
j
> If it wasnt for Tolya Krakuer may be dead and he knows that.
Please explain.
I think you’re a bit warped by your admiration of Boukreev.Just out of curiousity, how did you arrive at the 1/4 figure? Why not 1/8? or a 1/16?
LOL. It’s pretty obivious that Mr. Devine in not the brightest bulb in the barn, so let’s just leave it at that 1/4 figure and call it even.
New Mexico…sigh…what an idiot.
I’m nothing but a hill meanderer, but I am a pretty good reader, both of books and of human nature. I think some of the “mountain climbers” posting here are suffering from a permament lack of oxygen in their brains. It is very obvious, from both the 1996 calamities, and too many others besides, that the main problem is too many people are a) climbing mountains they are not fit for, by trying to buy an experience that is not really for sale, b) trying to profit from an enterprise that the mountain gods will never countenance and c) all forgetting that high mountains, like high seas are only straddled with the most fickle of permissions, and that no human being ever conquers these elemental furies of creation; if they survive it is because the beautiful deadly monster let them. (A little common sense and hubris might help) To that end, as regards Krakauer’s book, I think he does a pretty good job of spreading the blame all around, and if someone takes issue with their hero being criticized for taking money and then disregarding his duties, maybe they should look in the mirror, not at Krakauer. Mostly I think there is an inane jealousy of Krakauer because he’s actually been successful at something, which I suspect these posters know very little about: it is always easier to idolize a deficient big shot than to respect the real deal, if one suffers from dissatisfaction with ones own bona fides. Truly though, neither Boukreev nor Krakauer had much to do with the death toll on that ill-fated climb; it was primarily the competition between the two dead leaders, and the idiocy of the unworthy clients themselves. Which is why unnecessarily high death tolls continue on the world’s steepest stairways to Olympus.
Exactly. What I took away from these books, is that the whole commercialization of Everest is contemptible. I did not close the books thinking AB was a bad person.
“To that end, as regards Krakauer’s book, I think he does a pretty good job of spreading the blame all around, and if someone takes issue with their hero being criticized for taking money and then disregarding his duties, maybe they should look in the mirror, not at Krakauer. Mostly I think there is an inane jealousy of Krakauer because he’s actually been successful at something, which I suspect these posters know very little about: it is always easier to idolize a deficient big shot than to respect the real deal, if one suffers from dissatisfaction with ones own bona fides. Truly though, neither Boukreev nor Krakauer had much to do with the death toll on that ill-fated climb; it was primarily the competition between the two dead leaders, and the idiocy of the unworthy clients themselves.”
Well said, Star. And I’ve read both books…
I didn’t find Krakauer’s account exceptionally critical of Boukreev, but it might perhaps be said that he didn’t assess enough blame on Fisher and Hall; Fisher for his lack of leadership, and Hall for his stupendously poor judgment. He has said certain things that would lead one to believe that this was due to his desire to spare the bereaved families any further suffering, and frankly, I have ALWAYS took that to mean Fisher & Hall’s. ITA seems to cut Fisher & Hall more slack than he does for himself.
Boukreev, took great personal offense to Krakauer’s account, but it’s doubtful that most who have read Into Thin Air, and have no legendary “heroes” to defend, thought that Boukreev in particular had been singled out. Some people simply have a problem with accountability, and find it easier to shoot the messenger, than to take the message to heart. Boukreev’s biographer Weston DeWalt, took this philosophy to almost unheard of degree in his insinuating comments & rebuttals to Salon.com in 1998 – going so far as to infer that Krakauer’s presence on Everest, as a journalist writing about the expedition, was a large contributing factor in the 1996 disaster. Way to shoot your own credibility in the foot, Wes, and not do Boukreev any favors in the process.
Is it so damned hard to say “perhaps, if I had done this…”?
“He has said certain things that would lead one to believe that this was due to his desire to spare the bereaved families any further suffering, and frankly, I have ALWAYS took that to mean Fisher & Hall’s. ITA seems to cut Fisher & Hall more slack than he does for himself.”
Exactly.
I agree, and came to the same conclusion:
(a.) I did not find any criticism of AB to be harsh at all
(b.) AB was personally offended, and defended himself
(c.) A lot of people idolize AB and are rushing to his side of the issue, when there really shouldn’t have been an issue to begin with.
Let me be clear Mt Everest is like any other mountain. You want to summit and you don’t tell the boss what to do, Scott needed to prove something, something that killed him! At the South Col making a decision is not simple, and Beck was told to wait and he did that, that was his own downfall. B shouldn’t be allowed to climb without oxs, what he was a superb climber, and it was proven when he went to look for survivors, alone in the middle of a strom. You won’t get much help in Denali, so don’t expect anybody to help you at Camp 4. I met a Polish group who refused to trow me a rope while I was in the middle of crevasse at 7800 feet, so I jumped over and by a miracle I am still alive!. Pointing fingers is easy, while going from 16500 to 17000 my partner left me behind, while he was carrying my tent, finally I spent the night in a preachers tent ( I love that man). So if people are selfish at 7800 or 17000, what do you expect at 26000 feet, or 27000 feet? K, to me is a cowerd to speak about B in that way, a man who can hardly spoke English, a man who guided people for a living not to write a book.
Russians, and more in the high altitude business are hard as a rock, and on Everest you are on your own, that is why most climber would let you dye, more because you have one chance to reach the summit and 1/2 of that is to make back alive.
Regardless of what B could have had said to Scott, Scott was going to the summit, because that was his business, and Rob died because he couldn’t live with himself for not sticking with his turn around time. We all make wrong decisions, we climbed Mt Adams and slept in a cave at the summit because we made the wrong decision, and what was worse, my partner almost got killed because I agree with him to descend from a part of Mt Adams that is not a route and will never be one, and my partner wanted to take it and we took it. He fell 300 feet and boulder cut his head open really bad. You can’t stop strong people from making wrong decisions, and that was what killed B in a winter climb.If you climb Mt Everest you are on your own, like I was soloing denali in July!, I turned around because I want to come back and reach the summit, in Mt Everest I would have had kept going, once chance one life to live. Not everybody can pay $25000 to 300000 to climb Mt Everest. K is a strong climber, but I would decline any invitation to join any of his climbing trips, even if it is to climb Mt Hood.
Thanks Hebert
You are 100% right. I woud not climb with Jon Krakaer even 400 ft hill. Be afraid that he would write story about that during hike I pissed on wrong tree.
Pavel K.
I think opinions on this depend hugely on which of the two accounts you read first. I read Krakauer’s book long before I read Boukreev’s account and, although I don’t blame Boukreev for the accident, I largely follow Krakauer’s opinions. I also agree almost totally with Kim’s comments (see above).
Boukreev’s mountaineering achievements are truly great- this is beyond doubt- I can also (obviously) not comment on him as a person. But he seems to have made some errors of judgement on May 10 1996. He refused to accept these errors and never really explains them convincingly in his book.
Sure Krakauer has far less experience and also made several crucial mistakes that day himself but he openly accepts this. Boukreev’s seems unable to accept that possibly he also made some poor choices that day. He regularly climbed seperately from his clients (who were his purpose for being there) and left his pack behind- why?
There were of course, many other contributing factors to what happened in 1996. There were also many other people who made far greater human errors than either Krakauer or Boukreev (both Fischer and Hall in particular who, if accountability were to be meted out, must shoulder the blame). In a way, this makes this debate largely pointless. The fact is that people who climb Everest are risking their lives: sometimes things go wrong.
Nonetheless people should not allow somebody’s achievements to cloud their judgement of an isolated incident. Boukreev is a mountaineering legend, and will remain so, regardless of what he did that day. This doesn’t mean he wasn’t partly responsible for what happened on Everest in 1996. Even legends are human.
well said. Anatoli got more blame than he probably deserved and he did some pretty heroic stuff but he did make mistakes irrespective of the fact that he followed his beliefs and Fishers orders. Everyone makes mistakes. Hall may be a likable and loyal guide who was pretty organized but he should have gotten more blame, especially for not turning people back. But different people read things differently that why our comments differ so much. Same thing on the mountain in 1996, different people saw things differently, and it those conditions and with such stress no under accounts differ. It may be fun debating this but we weren’t there and its hard to judge especially since some questions will never be fully answered.
Watching and reading the stuff about the new expeditions (Everest: Beyond the limits) its amazing to me that some of the same stuff happens and how money is a big part of Everest. Too bad. Its a deadly place up top with very little margin for error. When weather turns bad (as it did in 1996) bad things happen. And from a decision making point of view (which is the one that drew me to the story), mistakes still happen. Its human nature.
It was unfortunately a great loss of human life and the emotions probably got better of Jon and Anatoli in the aftermath. It was really hard on them. Even harder on the families of people who were lost, my heart goes to them.
Happy New Year.
My point is yes, climbing much over 10,000 ft is real dangerous even for fit experienced climbers, and yes, if one wishes to spend their free time living dangerously, fine, great, its a free wonderful world, and while its not for me, I’m glad I live in a world where there are people like that. But fit experienced climbers of thin air KNOW the world up there is an individual do-or-die proposition, and while there are some teams of equal climbers who truly see themselves as one unit, and there are stories of collective doing-or-dying, they are the exception. Again, fine. And adhering to a hard core attitude about not wanting to be responsible for someone climbing’s misfortunes because of this personal code ONLY becomes a problem if you take money from someone you and they both know is at a disadvantage from the beginning because they really don’t belong in the thin air of the highest mountains, and when they give you that money, you are by virtue of taking it, telling them you WILL be responsible for them. If Mr. Boukreev had walked over a hundred dying idiots trying to climb a mountain they had no business being on, well, shrug! But when he partnered with weaker climbers, and led them to believe their relative safety could be bought from him, for him then to fall back on that hard-core code of mountain climbing being an individual challenge of doing-or-dying, was simply business fraud; the fact that the business was life and death leaves him, for all his climbing legendary status, a personal asshole. I think that was the only point Krakauer was trying to make. Just for fun, its kind of like the Michael Jackson thing. He was undoubtedly one of the top 5 most talented singer-dancer-entertainers ever of pop music. Thats one side of his bio. But to refuse to look at the other side of who he was because he was so great a talent is just like saying we don’t really need two eyes because one sees everything we need to see.
I definitely think Jon Krakauer singled out Anatoli and Lopsang specifically in his book. Probably this was because they were not in as good a position to defend themselves, one hardly speaking English and one being a Sherpa. No matter what Jon Krakauer thinks of Anatolis methods of guiding here are the FACTS:
Anatoli going up the mountain without using oxygen did not cause the deaths of Namba, Hall, Fisher or Hansen.
ALL of Anatoli’s clients came out of the situation ALIVE – 3 thanks in part to him going to rescue them.
Rob Hall’s clients were ROB HALL’S responsibility and the responsibility of his GUIDES. Why didn’t Mike Groom take Namba and Beck Weathers when he went back to camp. MIKE GROOM abandoned them there!!!!
Why did Rob Hall leave Beck Weathers alone for 8 hours instead of getting him back down to Camp IV when Beck admitted having problems??? And then some idiot claims Anatoli should have helped him down. NO ROB HALL SHOULD HAVE!!!!
Scott Fischer’s death was Scott Fischer’s fault and no one else’s!!! Scott Fischer had no reason to summit at all – all his clients had summited and came down – he saw them on their way back!!! If he had turned around right away he may have been able to assist Neil Beidelman and also may have survived!!!
Doug Hanson’s, Andy Harris’s and Namba’s death were solely the fault of ROB HALL. He is responsible for his clients and trying to force the issue to get Doug Hanson to the summit when it was too late in the day caused him to abandon any other clients that needed help on the mountain. He chose to stay with Doug Hanson which some find commendable but I do not. Doug Hanson should have been turned around at 2 p.m. and Rob Hall with him. Therefore, Doug would not have died, Rob would have been able to help Namba and, most probably, Andy Harris and would have been able to collect Beck Weathers before he almost died and suffered severe frostbite.
WHY are these facts NOT mentioned in Krakauer’s book – or rather glossed over. Seems he is more worried about Lopsang short-roping Sandy and Anatoli going down the mountain quickly and not using bottled oxygen. He seems to have no interest in making the ADVENTURE CONSULTANTS GUIDES responsible for the death and injury of the ADVENTURE CONSULTANTS CLIENTS!!!!!!
I think he singled Boukreev and Lopsang out because 1) their expected responsibilities as guide and sherpa, and 2) when they were of ‘reasonably’ sound mind and body – ascending from camp 4 – they made choices that were contrary to what is customary for a guide and sherpa and that subsequently added to the risk. That is, Boukreev not using O2 and Lopsang short-roping Sandy toward the very beginning of this final climb went against what a guiding company would typically want from these type of employees. Some of the story may have been lost in translation, but I never translated what I read in Krakauer’s book as expressing that Boukreev caused the death of anyone.
I am left with the understanding that if I were to climb Everest, even as a client, I should understand that in all likelihood, the shit will hit the fan, and that when it does, I should NOT expect my guides to save me. Thus, to me, no one is to be blamed here.
*I am easily persuaded by what I read and I’ve only read Into Thin Air. I very rarely blame anyone for the suffering of others – life is suffering after all.
Well said, Wendy.
Krakauer is simply not qualified to pass judgment – on any mountain climber, let alone those who are out of his league.
Ridiculous. You don’t have to be a chef to properly criticize someone’s cooking, and you don’t have to be a world-class climber to criticize the actions of a world-class climber.
You obviously know very little about Krakauer. He is a very accomplished climber, albeit at lower altitudes. You act as though he was a complete novice. Without even knowing you, I would surmise that he is more qualified to pass judgement of AB then you are of him.
THANKS Wendy!! Your comments have hit the nail on the head, and are what I have felt for years.
RIP Anatoli. You were a true hero.
This is fascinating. I haven’t stopped thinking about this event since I read Krakauer’s book 2 years ago. Then Boukreev’s right after that….then “Mountain Madness” about Scott and now Lene Gammelgaard’s book. I feel that Krakauer did an excellant job pointing out everyone’s faults especially his own. I love Boukreev but I believe he took offense to Krakauer’s account perhaps out of a guilty conscience. Does that make Boukreev more wrong in this event. No. The real conflict is personality and cultural diffences in how each man handles the losses. I believe Jon would have been more sympathetic if Anatoli would have spoken openly about his feelings instead of masking his pain and possible guilt. However, Anatoli had the language barrier and a cultural barrier. Oh it is so painful sorting the details when there are two sides to every story…..
Cathy, I think that’s a good point about cultural differences in dealing with loss. Btw, have you read Maria McCoffey’s book Where the Mountain Casts its Shadow? That sheds some light on how distressed Boukreev was and how he dealt with it.
No, I haven’t read McCoffey’s book yet but I am writing it down now and getting that one. Thank you!
Cathy:
Please explain what Anatoli could have been feeling any guilt over? He saved all his clients. The only thing he could possibly feel guilty about was not saving Scott Fischer which would have been impossible anyway. The reason Anatoli was so upset over Krakauer’s comments was because he was unfairly slandered in the American press. I think that would make anyone upset. And Krakauer did NOT do a good job of pointing out everyone’s faults. He forgot to point fingers and lay blame where the fault really belonged – on all of his own guides.
Losing Scott. When a person loses another and they were there to possibly change the events, there is a burden of guilt they must wrestle. Often times it isn’t the survivor’s fault but the feelings are still there to work through.
It might just be Coffey, come to think of it. I wrote the title and name from memory.
Wendy, your post is RIGHT FxxxING ON!!!
Krakauer is a wormjournalist. Anatoli had experience and knowledge as a mountaineer that Krakauer could only dream of. That same wisdom is what kept Krakauers hog wash and credibility in check. Krakauer resented the exposure and threat to his cash cow.
The most prestigious and recognized Alpine Association examined the facts and came to the conclusion that Anatoli acted heroically with great risk to his own life. The climbers he saved would have no doubt died on the mountain without his selfless efforts. Anatoli was presented with the Associations most coveted award for his heroism. I trust the judgement of this group of alpinists over a self inflating journalist anyday.
The fact that Anatoli climbed without oxygen on summit day is a moot point. The guy was an animal in the mountains. He stepped up and fixed lines where needed which was not his responsibility, allowing the clients from both expeditions to continue their ascent. The guy went without sleep for over 30 hours on summit day helping others. During this time he was faced with a decision, does he climb up to where he was told Scott Fischer the expedition leader was left sick by Lopsang or go to the clients who were lost and freezing on the South Col. As a professional Guide he made the proper decision and rescued the clients, thereby saving their lives.
Beck Weathers made a statement that when Krakauer descended to his location, he asked Krakauer to help him back to camp IV as he couldn’t see and needed someone to lead him. Krakauer left Weathers, his own team mate and proceeded to camp on his own.
Where was Krakauer when Anatoli was begging him and others for help in the double rescue…he was sleeping in his tent refusing to help. Krakauer climbed all day on oxygen and didn’t save anyone but himself. So I couldn’t care less if Anatoli climbed with or without oxygen on summit day. Anatoli climbing without oxygen was still twice the man Krakauer was ON oxygen. Krakauer tries to endear readers to him by admitting some of his shortfalls hoping they stay on for the ride through his false judgements and accusations.
It is common knowledge through the climbing ranks that Krakauer stooped so low as to present himself and an accomplice at one of Anatolis speaking engagements trying to discredit Anatolis mountaineering experience. This Krakauer is a real piece of work not to mention the magazine he wrote the piece for.
Make no mistake, Anatoli was the real deal, a great climber, mountaineer and person. It is sad that an individual that is jealous of these attributes would further expose his own lack of morals with a strategy of insults, slander and falsehoods. Why Anatolis estate hasn’t sued this guy and the magazine is beyond me.
I truly wish that Krakauer and others had Anatolis skills, morals and wherewithal on the mountain that night. If they did they would have got off their asses, assisted in the rescue and fewer would have died or suffered life long damage from frostbite. These people refused to help their OWN team mates and want to shift the blame to Anatoli who wasn’t even a part of their expedition. GET REAL!
Anatoli was NOT RESPONSIBLE for Rob Halls clients PERIOD. Rob Hall had his own expedition guides. Rob Hall had to stay with Doug Hansen to the end as it was Rob who talked Doug into continuing up the mountain when Doug wanted to turn around.
Andy Harris was a hero for his efforts in helping Rob Hall with Doug Hansen at the Hillary Step, which ultimately cost Andy his life.
One thing I find very interesting and virtually ignored is the Poisk oxygen debacle. The Fischer expedition bought $30,000 of bottled oxygen for this trip, the majority of which was to be manufactured by Poisk. The year of the disaster Fischer was not able to buy directly from Poisk and had to go through a middle man/broker. The delivery of the oxygen was continually delayed until just a few days before the expeditions departure for Base Camp, which is very unusual. With all the underhanded crimes going on in the Everest camps now, gear and oxygen thefts etc. I ask, would it be to far fetched to examine the possibility that the Fischer Expedition never received the pure Poisk Oxygen they had bought.
With all the like new-used Poisk bottles laying around and the fact it can be documented that some were retrieved from Everst and packed out prior to the disaster, could it be reasonably assumed that a valuable commodity such as Oxygen may have been counterfeited and black marketed. The used bottles could very easliy have been refilled by others than Poisk and filled with compressed air and not oxygen, then delivered to the expedition represented as new pure oxygen. I know it could very easily be done.
Fischer became sicker on the Oxygen bottles. Lopsang became violently ill and was throwing up after he started using the oxygen. Other members were having difficulties with moisture freezing and clogging regulators and masks (there is a lot of moisture in compressed air). Coincidence, maybe, but I think it brings up serious questions that merit further investigation.
this is a very interesting point, http://7summits.com/forum/index.php?topic=453.0
Thoughts?
An interesting twist. Has Todd defended himself? These are pretty serious allegations.
Great post TonyRay!!! You are right on about Anatoli. And you bring up a very interesting point about the bottled oxygen. It’s something I had never thought of but it is certainly an interesting possibility. They got their oxygen through Henry Todd who has actually been embroiled in a scandal before. It wouldn’t be too much to a stretch to think he may have been the culprit. (this is just my own thought).
But really, about Anatoli, I have to say anyone who reads ‘Into Thin Air’ and has ANY common sense should immediately think – how was anyone on the Mountain Madness team responsible for the deaths of anyone on the Adventure Consultants team? That was my first thought – when I knew nothing about the disaster or climbing or Mt. Everest. It seems a completely obvious and pertinent fact to me. Perhaps there are a great many people who read this book and lack common sense!
Wendy,
Are you suggesting that one doesn’t have a responsibility for others who are distressed on Everest, simply because they are on another team? It seems to me the two teams were basically in the thick of the storm together, at similar altitudes, and, as was noted on Krakauer’s book, Neal Beideleman and others went out of their way to help others not on the same team.
There was also a brief part in Krakauer’s book which mentions three Japanese climbers who were so hungry to reach the summit that they merely passed three members of an Indo-Tibetan team who were dying on the mountain, not even checking to see if their regulators were working properly. When asked about it afterword, one said “There’s no room for morality on Everest.” I have to strongly disagree, as this isn’t the kind of behavior or world I want to live with or in.
Some of the commenters here are a little too eager to call Anatoli a “hero” simply because he was “badass” enough to climb Everest without oxygen. I don’t think Krakauer ascribed a disproportionate amount of blame to Anatoli, compared to himself or others, but it seems to me the mere fact that Anatoli had climbed the mountain without oxygen in the past has very little to do with whether or not he was an effective guide on this particular expedition.
It seems to me it was incredibly careless and stubborn on his part, and reckless for Scott Fischer to agree that Anatoli go without oxygen. He wasn’t on a solo expedition. Did the clients on the team have a say in whether they felt comfortable with this set-up? I would bet that if asked, they would have preferred that he use it, because, as we all saw, maybe he would have been more effective a guide with it. Why chance it?
Try reading Lene Gammelgard’s book, Climbing High. She was an actual client of Anatoli’s and had nothing but positive things to say about him and certainly had no issue with him not using oxygen. Truth is, Anatoli didn’t need oxygen. He very rarely climbed with it and the problems did not occur because Anatoli summited without oxygen.
Anatoli’s main responsibility was his own clients. That is who he took care of first and rescued. He had already made two trips in blizzard conditions after summiting that very day and did not have the strength to go back for Namba and Weathers.
Also, for your information, Mike Groom (who was an Adventure Consultants guide) was in the group huddled in the storm with Neal Beidelman and he left the group to return to camp without either Namba or Weathers. So please tell me why if he couldn’t manage to save his own clients why Anatoli should have saved them prior to saving his own clients?
And I agree that Neal Beidelman went out of his way to help others not on his team. He also was a hero, no doubt about that. But who are these others you mention that assisted team members that were not their own. Neal Beidelman is the ONLY guide on Everest that night that helped anyone outside his own clients. Certainly Rob Hall did not nor Andy Harris nor Mike Groom.
If Andy Harris and Rob Hall had been doing THEIR jobs properly no one else would have had to be burdened with assisting THEIR clients!
THAT is what should have stood out in Krakauer’s book if he wanted to question people’s judgments.
Anatoli was not a hero because he climbed Mt. Everest without oxygen. Anatoli was a hero because he went out in blizzard conditions with no visibility – after an exhausting summit of Everest that left every other person in camp unable to move – and rescued three people from death. THAT is what a hero is. Someone who risks their own life to save others and that is what Anatoli did that night.
Wendy,
Krakauers book “Into Thin Air” needed a culprit a bad guy if you will. It’s evident he chose the wrong guy to shift the blame on. Since most of the dramatic events took place while Krakauer was in camp four sleeping, refusing to help anyone. One must come to the conclusion that the basis for his writing came from anything but first hand, eyewitness experience. Instead it is obviously a fabricated nonfactual reconstruction of the events.
Anatoli Boukreev’s book “The Climb” was written from the eyewitness perspective of an actual participant in the events including the actual rescue attempts.
When reading Kraukauers book you get the feeling your reading an extended egotistical resume of someone who is insecure with his own abilities.
I didn’t think it was possible to associate any comedy with this trajedy until I was presented with the opportunity to watch the movie “Into Thin Air”. During the first five minutes of the movie it becomes painfully obvious that it is an extremely low budget film. They couldn’t even get the landmarks right on the Everest map. The clothing and gear is wrong. The settings aren’t even close. The facts and reenactments are worse than Krakauers book. On the South Col from camp four they have Krakauer attempting a rescue, braving the elements striking out at night in a blizzard with one of the lead Sherpas begging him to abandon the effort. Makes you want to puke when the facts show Krakauer was hiding in his tent and refused any participation in the rescue attempts. For Krakauer to put his endorsement on this movie with the use of his name only reinforces ones disgust in this persons lowly character.
It is also interesting to note that the movie didn’t provide a credit for the actress who portrayed Sandy Pittman.
“When reading Kraukauers book you get the feeling your reading an extended egotistical resume of someone who is insecure with his own abilities.”
I didn’t get that at all. I think Krakauer makes it clear in the book that the facts presented were as he recalled them occurring at a high altitude when everyone’s judgment was affected, including his. To say that he was hiding in the tent while a major storm stirred over the camp, refusing to help, is a little too much.
For one, everyone who made it back to camp that afternoon/evening was in bad shape, emotionally and physically exhausted, and affected by the altitude. Plus, it didn’t seem as though anyone could hear what was going on outside, other than a huge storm. And if Krakauer is “guilty”, then so, too is everyone else who made it back to their tents that day and collapsed from exhaustion and altitude sickness.
It seemed to me from Krakauer’s book the author feels enormous guilt over what transpired; I didn’t feel that the book was exploitative or overly critical towards others but not to himself. To the contrary, it seemed he ruminated over the “what if’s”. Anatoli, Fischer, and Hall were acting as guides, and they all acted recklessly, putting others’ safety in danger unnecessarily, from allowing the likes of Sandy Pittman to even attempt to summit, to not using oxygen. Of course, and I think Krakauer is the first to state this is his book, nearly everyone involved probably could have done something differently.
I cannot imagine what it would have been like to survive that disaster. At any rate, it’s easy to judge others when we haven’t been in their shoes, especially those walking at 28,000+ feet.
Anatoli’s client’s lived without any severe injuries or disabilities. Anatoli is a HERO, so get over it already.
On the other hand, Krakauer is a chickenshit coward who refused to help anyone but himself and then tried to discredit and defame the person who actually saved lives and participated in the rescues. Was it because Krakauer thought Anatoli was stealing his glory, possibly, especially when considering how Krakauer had the movie producers portray him in the movie. The guy is a WORM!
Funny, I don’t remember much criticism of Rob Hall in “Into Thin Air”. Maybe I should go back and read it again. Hilarious that you mention guides acting recklessly by “allowing the likes of Sandy Pittman to even summit” but fail to mention the fact that Rob Hall allowed the likes of Doug Hansen to summit and that was the direct cause of his death, Doug Hansen’s death and the most likely cause of Andy Harris’s death, Yasuko Namba’s death and Beck Weather’s severe injuries.
I’m curious as to whether you have read “The Climb”? It seems to me all your statements are based on “Into Thin Air” which is not necessarily completely factual. If you have not read “The Climb”, I would definitely suggest it so you can get both sides of the story.
Oh please don’t get me started on that movie!!! I was so angry with the blatant attempt to make Jon Krakauer look like a hero – despite any facts to the contrary that I had to turn it off!! Of all the ridiculously incorrect movies, this has to be the absolute worst!!!
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90374592
This is a good interview with David Breashears who made the documentary called “Storm Over Everest.”
In this interview Braeshears recognized Anatoli’s heroic efforts but doesn’t understand why the members of the group were without him in the first place.
Braeshears to Neal Conan’s “I don’t know what Anatoli was thinking that day. I don’t know what Scott told him. I don’t know if I would have done that myself. It seems more appropriate for a guide to be with their clients on such a big mountain as Everest than down in the high camp waiting for them. It’s hard to provide aid and assistance when you’re – the people you’re in charge of protecting or guiding to safety are up in a storm above you.”
Now that is a common sense statement if I have ever heard one!
That statement may sound well and good, but the first thing you have to understand especially when climbing above 8000 meters is the fact that the #1 component for any rescue at that altitude is bottled oxygen. The oxygen that was carried on the mountain that day was already used, in use or in reserve on the south summit for descending climbers.
Any additional oxygen, rope, equipment or food that could have been used for any potential rescue attempts was located at camp four on the South Col. Many alpinists believe Anatoli made the right decision, positioning himself as to allow the use of these items if needed. The fact of the matter is there was a minimum of four guides and additional sherpa strung out all over the mountain during the descent and no one at camp four to organize a rescue with the neccessary items. Anatoli knew this, Scott knew this and they made the only logical decision.
While I respect David Breashears personal accomplishments in the mountains I question some of the content in Storm over Everest. Why in the world would he showcase Sandy Pittman heralding her as this great mountaineering woman with great respect for the mountains. When it is commonly agreed that the fact Lopsang had short roped her, literally towing her up the mountain, was responsible for causing many of the crucial delays to the other clients ascent. Lopsang was previously assigned to share the responsibility of laying safety rope ahead of the clients. It can be reasonably assumed that if Lopsang did not short rope Sandy he would have layed the rope on time ahead of the clients, thus allowing for a smooth transition and seperation of the clients to the summit without the bottleneck delays. This would have also allowed a timely summit and descent that would have missed the storm all together. What does Mr. Breashears have to say about this? We will probably never know. Is it because Sandy possibly contributed to his film aspirations?
Cathy:
AGAIN – Even if David Breashear’s opinions (who was not on the mountain with them so can only be going by second hand information) seem common sense to you – please tell me how Anatoli’s decisions on the mountain caused the deaths of the Adventure Consultants clients?
Oh and by the way – Anatoli did come most of the way down the mountain with a client – Martin Adams. People for some reason seem to forget that fact. Also, if he had not come down earlier than the other clients (who were with a guide – Neil Beidelman) then he could not have gone out to arrange a rescue. Why does that not make sense?
Again, I will ask – why were the Adventure Consultant guides not being responsible for their own clients? Why isn’t there widespread criticism of THEIR actions that day? How is sitting on the top of the mountain with one ailing client considered noble but coming down the mountain in the lead with one client then resting in order to assist anyone who might be in trouble considered terrible and wrong? Why is it so incredibly hard to place the blame where it belongs? On the Adventure Consultant guides – specifically Rob Hall.
I have to rephrase something as it sounds incorrect. David Breashears was technically on the mountain – but at base camp at the time. What I was meaning was that he was not up on the mountain with them.
One overwhelming fact stands out. ALL of Rob Halls client’s who died on the mountain were assisted by guides on their descent. Rob Halls Guides had run out of oxygen, were disoriented and as helpless as the clients.
Dear Wendy,
The only reason that is ‘wrong’ is that Anatoli was Russian. IMO Jon Krakauer thought he tap into anti-russian sentiments in the American public and conveniently blame Anatoli while getting rich on the resulting publicity. It looks like it worked out really well for Jon Krakauer — the mainstream public version of the story was the Krakauer version. Kudos to the American Alpine Club and Americans like Tony Ray and yourself who refuse to be taken by his lowness and have steadfastly defended Anatoli, a great great alpinist.
thanks!
Shahid:
I agree that Anatoli was an easy target for Krakauer because he was Russian. Krakauer also targeted Lopsang because Lopsang was an easy one to blame. Neither Anatoli nor Lopsang had much of a means to defend themselves, particularly in the US.
I appreciate the compliment. Honestly, I just hate to see heroic acts diminished by “journalists”. In reading all the books about the 96 disaster, I never came away with the view that any of the deaths and injuries on the mountain were Anatoli’s fault – or Lopsang’s or Sandy Pittman’s. I believe Krakauer was desperate to put the blame on anyone else rather than his own guides. And clearly, they were the ones who did not properly care for their clients. I wish everyone could realize that. Why people choose to be swayed by a sensationalist journalist who wasn’t even in the camp that Anatoli was a guide for, I cannot understand.
Boukreev didn’t come down with Martin Adams. If he had, Adams wouldn’t have started to descend the Kangshung face into Tibet at the Balcony. And if he had gone down with the other clients, they may have moved faster and they wouldn’t have needed rescuing in the first place.
I have read “Into Thin Air, “The Climb”, “High Exposure” by D. Breahears, and Beck Weathers’ book. I am not a mountain climber but have studied and worked in the field of human behavior. What has stood out to me in Krakauer’s book as well as some of his reported public behaviors related to his dispute with Anatoli, and some of his inappropriate language in letters to magazines and websites on this subject, is his inability to stop himself from assigning blame and criticizing others, and the emotional investment he had to make Anatoli accept blame. It just seems like an dicey position to take about two men, Anatoli and Lopsang Sherpa, who could have easily lost their lives assisting others that day while he is his sleeping bag too exhausted to help. Does he feel that he is a better man that Anatoli was because he can accept some blame? Well, good for him. Maybe he is a better man than Anatoli was, in some ways, but who makes it such a mission in life to make sure that everyone believes you are right, especially when lives have been lost. Krakauer is in a profession where people are paid to criticize his work. It goes with the territory. Anatoli Boukreev’s and Lopsang Sherpa’s profession does not normally, I would think, have print critics in the way and to the degree that professional writer’s, like Krakauer, does. Krakauer shows no insight into how criticizing someone’s professional work ethics and judgments can be a very personal affront. In his profession he has editors, fact checkers, and proof readers to go over his work and help perfect it before it is presented to the public. There are no do-overs for mountain guides at 29,000 feet in a blizzard. He had no idea of what plans Scott and Anatoli had made or not made. Yet he feels free to offer his critique of their work, morals, and ethics. And, he shows a complete lack of understanding of these gentlemen’s cultural backrounds. In the states we all seem to get a kick out of criticizing others. Reality TV in the states is based on the public failures of individuals and the ensuing elimination from the show and shaming those who have failed. And, watching those failed people cry seems to be a big part of the entertainment value. In real life, in the US and other countries failure and public embarrassment are not always viewed as being great entertainment. Sometimes, in some cultures it is seen as shaming the whole family. It would benefit Jon to learn not to project our values onto people from other cultures. Many other cultures do take exception and offense to public criticism, espcially from somone not from their culture. At the end of “Into Thin Air”, in “Author’s Note”, Krakauer does not seem to understand the anger and hurt of some of the relatives and friends of some of the victims of the ’96 disaster. He says his intent was to tell what happened as accurately and honestly as possible in a senstive and respectful manner. Sensitive and respectful? He’s got to be kidding. It is possible to tell the story of what happened in an event without pointing fingers and assigning blame but Krakauer could not resist the urge to do both, with great personal harm to both Lopsang Sherpa and Anatoli Boukreev, who are both, unfortunately, no longer with us. Both may have made mistakes that day on the mountain but my question is, why does Krakauer feel that he needs to be the one to point this out to people who read his books all over the world? In the introduction to “Into Thin Air”, Krakauer says that several authors and editors counseled him not to write the book as quickly as he did. They urged him to wait 2-3 years to gain some crucial perspective. He ignored their advice “mostly because what happened on the mountain was gnawing my guts out. I thought that writing the book might purge Everest from my life.” Seems like he would have been better served to talk with a therapist and work out his feelings rather than to write a book publicly criticizing professionals in a field other than his field of expertise, and from other cultures who do not do things and live life the same way that Jon does.
Did you not read “Climbing High” by Lene Gammelgaard? Seems like you have read all the other books relating to the ’96 disaster. I really like her book though she goes into her own personal preparations and philosophies quite a bit (didn’t bother me but might be annoying to others). She has a very clear, concise account of the events that night plus a good insight into what was going on in the Mountain Madness camp. I think you would enjoy it.
Thanks for the recommendaton, Wendy. I’ll check it out.
Great post Tony. Having a dead or immobile guide is not going to save anyone. Having a guide who has some energy and is carrying oxygen and warm liquid is going to save your life.
A guide who is without oxygen is as confused and useless and Krakauers account of the events. He should bury his head in shame.
Hey Wendy…you ready to climb?
I wish TonyRay! Unfortunately, I’m not that much of a risk taker and have a terrible fear of heights! I’d rather just read about it!
Are you a climber? Based on your posts you seem very knowledgeable, so I assumed you were.
Hey Wendy…believe it or not a lot of climbers as well as pilots have a fear of heights. With practiced skills, technique and most of all judgement a lot of that fear goes away and turns into respect instead.
Since you read a lot about it you must harbor some desire to try it.
An inexperienced person doesn’t have to start out on Everest (although many are doing just that now). There are a lot of neat short climbs you can start with. A little instruction would have you ready for a fun climb up Devils Tower or the Grand Tetons. Your confidence would soar and you would be planning your next climb. Believe it or not, these two climbs are actually more technical than anything on Everests most traveled route.
It’s to bad that a lot of people with the desire to climb will be turned away by stories of diasaster on 8000 meter and above Mtns. There are a lot of places across the U.S. within easy reach that offer fun recreational climbing for all levels of experience.
If your interested tell the administrator I said it was ok for you to email me direct.
TonyRay:
Thank you for the offer. I do admire mountain climbers and think it is very impressive but I myself am not a risk taker and prefer to stay safely on the ground.
You are more than welcome to email me if you would like. I do enjoy discussing mountain climbing and Anatoli with you.
No clients (or hired guides) on Scott Fisher’s team died – they were all from Rob Hall’s team. If not for Anatoli Boukreev this would not have been the case.
After reading all mentioned books one comparison comes to mind. “Die hard ” . Remeber the ever rpesent annoying selfcentered journalist and Jonh Mclane? The wanker and the hero. R.I. P. Anatoli. You are a real “Die hard”. I am proud to be Russian , but will never be as brave as you.
There was not enough bottled oxygen on the mountain. If Anatoli had used oxygen there would have been even less. Also, if you are on oxygen and it runs out, you can quickly become incapacitated. The fact that he was acclimatized well enough to climb without oxygen allowed him to continue doing so (and go out to rescue his clients) even after the oxygen supplies were running low and eventually exhausted.
I’ve read it all and it really seems like a lot of people sneering at Krakauer’s account are doing so not because of any particular factual reason, but because they’d rather be on the side of the mountaineering legend, the Bruce Willis, etc. than the guy who writes. Maybe it makes you feel more like a mountaineer?
I want to make a point that has been well-made but bears repeating, especially to Wendy and TonyRay who seem to be trying to one-up each other in exalting Boukreev’s divinity and bad-mouthing Krakauer. You don’t become more “in the know” by taking such a simplistic view. Imagine this:
Let’s say Anatoli Boukreev is practically Jesus Christ incarnate. He is the greatest mountaineer the world has ever seen. His spit turns to liquid gold. Everybody who follows mountaineering can and should idolize him as a great.
But, on a particular trip during which he has been hired to take care of others, some questionable orders are given, some people are getting sick, and he doesn’t do the thing that most non-mountaineers would imagine people do, namely, stick around with the people who need help, find out what’s going on, and so on. Some deaths result, and might have been prevented if nearly every person on the mountain had made some different decisions, including Boukreev.
Does that make everything else about the guy vanish? Is he no longer a great mountaineer, a superhuman whose feet we should all dream to kiss?
I’d argue not really. Certainly not from any account I’ve read, including Into Thin Air, which wasn’t far enough off from the truth for everyone to act like it was an evil hackjob by a guy who hates Russians. The guy spends pages of his book on bad decisions made by everybody on the mountain, not the least of which include clients who shouldn’t have been up there and himself. Some of his evaluation might be spotty (like the Boukreev without oxygen thing) but in the end nearly everyone could have done something different and improved things:
For example, Boukreev could have insisted Fischer descend. He had very good and understandable reasons not to (Fischer being the boss, language barrier, you name it), and didn’t, but he could have, and that might have helped the situation a lott. Does that mean the dude has to be toppled from the podium of high altitude climbers? Of course not. But to deny that certain people could have done things differently that would have helped (especially while raging on and on about how a certain other person, Krakauer, could have) is disingenuous. Boukreev COULD have done things differently, as could everyone else, as Krakauer points out at great lengths. You could even say he could have done things “even better” or “even MORE heroically”, if you feel.
Krakauer also makes great points about wider, systemic problems with bad planning and pay-to-climb on Everest, which definitely get a hell of a lot more words than Boukreev’s hasty descent. I would argue that the biggest problem is that so many people want to do it that weaker people pay their way way up there and force these kinds of situations to happen. That’s not Boukreev’s fault, and that is the paramount point Jon Krakauer seems to be making. “Into Thin Air” isn’t some mad racist excuse to blame deaths on the Russian, it’s not even very strong blaming anyone when you put things in perspective – what in the hell is everyone doing up on Everest anyway?? Does anyone think that with 500 people summiting annually that it’s anything more special than running a marathon under a certain time? It’s a lot deadlier than a marathon though, and that’s what Krakauer was saying – small decisions that shouldn’t matter (nor, crucially, impugn anyone’s character) amplify things into disasters, so it’s a pastime best left to extremely strong, special people like Boukreev and peers, who are less likely to need urgent help.
So get over the KRAKAUER VS BOUKREEV SMASHFEST FRIDAY NIGHT FIGHTS stuff and understand that there were much bigger messages coming across than who is better: one guy or another guy.
C. you obviously have no experience in the mountains or you are Krakauer ghost writing your piece.
Once again, all of the client’s Boukreev was hired to help that were a part of his expedition survived.
What added to the confusion is that every member from both expeditions had already accepted defeat in camp four due to the verocious windstorm that was pummeling the South Col immediately prior to the summit attempt. The wind abruptly ceased and the decision was hastily made by one expedition to go. When the other expedition saw the other team members preparing they too decided to go. This was poor decision making by both expedition leaders and was obviously based on their need not to be outdone by the other which ultimately put their clients at risk.
Boukreev was a guide employed by one expedition not two. He did his job to the best of his ability and the direction given him by his boss.
If Boukreev would have stayed on the mountain helping Rob Hall or Fischer one could very easily come to the conclusion that everyone he rescued on the South Col would have died.
The two expedition leaders were competing for fame and glory that produced a greedy cloud over their judgement, which in the end became a bigger obstacle than Everest itself.
TonyRay –
I had that same thought about Krakauer! I thought wow here is Jon Krakauer himself writing on this website! LOL!!!
Why are going going ad hominem on someone who disagrees with you?
You think Karkauer’s the only one that would think that way? How condescending!
After reading both Into Thin Air and The Climb, I read Climbing High by Lene Gammelgaard who was on the Scott Fisher team. Lene brings another facet to the story which is her relationship with Anatoli and her understanding of his relationship with Scott. Lene never once blamed Anatoli for anyone’s death. On the contrary, she praised Anatoli for going out into the storm to rescue people 3 times after having returned from the summit without oxygen. Anatoli was a rock of strength and determination. He would have saved Scott if he could have. I think Krakauer needed to blame someone for screwing up. His own leader was dead leaving a pregnant wife and an entire team of climbers. Can’t yell or accuse Rob Hall of incompetence at high altitude….Being an American, Krakauer needed to put the blame on someone. Someone has to be accountable for the problem. Someone is at fault and they will pay the price by being humiliated beyond words. Anatoli was a great target because he did a great job getting his team down and no one except Scott died. Anatoli was a force to be reckoned with . I do believe Krakauer was a bit intimidated. I would go as far as to say, Krakauer was unconsciously jealous of his extraordinary abilities. BUT, the blame has to go somewhere….so blame the weakest of the lot…the one with the worst English who Krakauer THOUGHT couldn’t fight back or defend himself in ENGLISH. But Anatoli did and so did Lene. I believe Anatoli was a gentle rock of a giant and a hero. I think Krakauer is suffering survival guilt. Krakauer displaced his own guilt of failing to help anyone by blaming Anatoli.
I have read “Into Thin Air”, “The Climb” and numerous other articles on the 1996 Everest disaster.. It seems to me that Scott Fischer was expecting a degree of accountability from Boukreev for his clients safety that Boukreev did not demonstrate until too late. Boukreev was paid more than twice what Groom and Biederman were paid to guide and by the summit day Fischer was very frustrated with him for not fulfilling his responsibilities.I’ve read this may have been a conflict in climbing styles. Fischer believed the clients should be “babysat” up the mountain and Boukreev held to a strong ethos of personal responsibility. Nonetheless, Fischer was running up and down the mountain, depleting his own strength, to pick up the slack for Boukreev. Many of the people on that climb, from what I have read, had nothing but contempt for Boukreev after the climb. I am not saying he is a monster but if you feel you need to write a book to explain “your side of the story”, you must have been feeling some degree of guilt.
I would just add one more thing that stands out as questionable about Boukreev’s behavior. Why did he go to the summit without oxygen when he was guiding a group of people? Before his own personal goals, he had a responsibility to be in the best shape he could be in for the clients. Also people on this site have remarked that Fischer’s group all lived as opposed to Rob Hall’s. That is partially due to Hall giving oxygen tanks to members of Fischer’s team like Sandy Pittman.
What are you talking about? Hall did not give any oxygen tanks to Sandy Pittman. Lene Gammelgaard gave HER oxygen tank to Sandy Pittman. As stated a million times before, the Mountain Madness team ran out of oxygen and did not have enough for everyone to get up and down the mountain. Hence, Lene having to give hers to Sandy. Now if Anatoli had been using oxygen there would have been even LESS for the clients. Not to mention that Anatoli very rarely used oxygen on the mountains and didn’t need it. It would have been MUCH MORE irresponsible to use up oxygen that the clients desperately needed when he didn’t need it, don’t you think?
The thing I don’t understand about Anatoli on this particular climb, is since he was acting as a guide why did he not wear oxygen? To me that seems very irresponsible as a guide. This one decision affected everything he did that day.
Over Christmas vacation and looking for something to do on the computer I remembered this discussion and thought I’d look it up (after a couple years). I was surprised that people are still at it! Well, it mostly made me sad that so many people defending Boukreev (to the death, pardon the expression) are operating out of a “political” mindset, you know, America the great Satan and Russia the great victim? Come on people! Whatever you think about Krakauer and Boukreev, spare me the silly ethnic obsession. And btw, I’m nowhere near a card-carrying American jingoist, I’m a George Soros liberal, but this crying foul about a mountaineering disaster, in the name of “political” and “ethnic” hype strikes me as pathetic. And it only increases my worries about this old world we co-inhabit.
I would like any information responsible and reasonable people could share about what is the status of guided climbing on the world’s tallest peaks? Have any lessons been learned, or is it just a matter of time before more mass disaster strikes?
Star Hill – I think you’re reading a lot of your own opinion into others’ criticisms. I’ve read the comments from top to bottom and did not detect any hint of anti-Americanism. The point most were trying to make (and I can’t speak as to whether it’s correct or not) is that it may not be a coincidence that the two people written about most negatively by Krakauer are the two least able to competently deal with American media, due to language and geographical barriers.
That said,
There are two criticisms of Boukreev that get repeated ad neaseum, and neither hold water. First, his non-use of oxygen. It’s repeatedly called irresponsible. But what problems did it actually cause? What irresponsible decisions did it lead him to make?
The second point is his rapid descent from the summit in order to prepare to relieve any beleagured climbers coming behind. This gets repeated over and over, with the general consensus of his critics being that he cared little for the clients. However, this decision actually turned out to be one of the most prudent on the mountain that day. He was the only person in good enough condition to mount a rescue, ultimately because he had gone down earlier and rested.
Nice post Justin. I agree with you completely. The point was not Anatoli being RUSSIAN. It was Anatoli being unable to defend himself. Same with Lopsang. Doesn’t mean we are making a American v. Tibetan controversy.
My whole problem with Krakauer and everyone hear on this website that wants to fault Anatoli is this: Anatoli did absolutely nothing to cause any deaths on Mt. Everest that day. Anatoli was NEVER responsible for any of the Adventure Consultant clients. If Krakauer wanted to assign blame it needed to be assigned to Rob Hall. HE is the one ultimately responsible for HIS clients and HE is the one that failed them. Criticizing Anatoli and Lopsang just makes no sense at all. He’s just trying to deflect blame away from where it should have been placed – on Rob Hall.
As for Scott Fischer’s death, that was Scott Fischer’s fault and no one else’s. Both Scott Fischer AND Rob Hall are the ones that acted irresponsibly that day. Not Anatoli. Anatoli was one of the few guides that actually acted sensibly. He did not climb with oxygen (to which Scott Fischer AGREED and PREFERRED) which saved oxygen for the clients, who were in dire need of it. He came down early with Martin Adams because he was in the lead (again AGREED and PREFERRED by Scott Fischer). Scott Fischer had been quoted as saying that he wanted Anatoli in the lead and back to camp early so he could “pull us off the mountain if we got into trouble”. Which is exactly what he did.
http://7summits.com/forum/index.php?topic=453.0
discuss
Remember people……Krakauer WAS a client and Boukreev was a hired guide.
to be honest no one will ever know what actually happened, ive read many accounts of the disaster and believe there was a lot of confusion on the hill on that day.
we will never know all the details and to speculate is just disrespectfull.
whats fuelled the fire, the same thing that pours fuel on any fire, the media.
Its time to let it be, it was a sad day.
I’ve read both books and I come away with the feeling that Boukreev acted appropriately. After reading The Climb, I can understand why Boukreev felt compelled to respond to the analysis of Krakauer. Boukreev’s arguments and explanations regarding Krakauer’s assertions of Boukreev’s actions are way more convincing. The argument about Boukreev’s gear being inadequate, questioning his going without oxygen, and Krakauer’s out right ignoring the fact that Scott Fischer instructed Boukreev to descend: none of these arguments, many of which were based in solid evidence have been addressed reasonably by Krakauer in his rebutals. Krakauer shows a malicious side especially in his responses to the questions brough forth by Boukreev and his co-author.
His open attack during Boukreev’s REI lecture question and answer session sealed it for me. Krakauer seems so caught up in the web he created , so emotionally and financially invested in his version of the story that he had to throw out childish insults in a public forum. I don’t see how anyone could come away from those readings and not feel that Krakauer was irresponsible and out right wrong in some cases in his analysis of Boukreev.
Boukreev was a hero. Krakauer’s story just has too many holes with regards to his analysis of Boukreev.
Wendy was right that Rob Hall and Scott Fischer were the ones that should carry the burden of responsibility for the tragedy because of the systemic and judgemental errors influenced by the high stakes financial incentives of getting clients to the top.
Unfortunatly Rob and Scott arent able to defend themselves or to shed light on the situation.
I have been trekking and climbing in Himalayas for last few years on various expeditions mostly into a support role as I know I do not have the physical strength to go all the way yet. (I don’t mind to accept that.) Highest point I have reached is South Cole on Everest.
I have read Into Thin Air, The Climb and books from Beck Weathers, Lene Gammelgaard and by many authors. It is very easy for Krakauer’s supporters to criticize Boukreev, but from an un-biased and little experienced person’s point of view I feel Boukreev’s actions were most logical and according to situation required. Here are the reasons I feel for that :-
1. I had met Boukreev in Kathmandu weeks before he perished in Annapurna winter accent in 1997. I talked with him about the use of bottled oxygen. He was clearly not comfortable using the bottled oxygen as a climbing aid and had his own reasons for it. His non-use of the bottled oxygen did not harm anyone on the fateful day on Everest in 1996 and if he had used bottled oxygen his team members would have been deprived of the same which was already a shortage.
2. Between Boukreev and Scott Fischer, it was agreed the Boukreev and Lopsang will climb without bottled oxygen as it was possible for them. His performance on the day without bottled oxygen was not affected at all. His decision of descending ahead of all had a logical reasoning behind it. There was no body on the South Cole who could have mounted any rescue if needed, so the most logical aspect was for Boukreev to descend and be ready for rescue if needed. He and Fischer were not aware of 3 climbers from Rob Hall’s team had turned around. The decision to descend fast eventually proved critical as he was the one who had enough energy to save 3 climbers stranded near the South Cole.
3. Rob Hall had been insisting on the turnaround time to be 1.00 pm as Krakauer had specified in his book. Considering he had put 1 hour buffer to that time, that time comes to 2.00 pm. Hall himself had not followed this turnaround time when he had climbed with Doug Hansen to the summit. The main reason behind this most likely is that previous year Hansen was turned back by Hall due to bad weather and he felt it was his moral responsibility that he ensures Hansen reaches the summit. Hall himself sacrificed his life to get Hansen to summit, but in that process he ignored the most important principle of the guide, the safety first approach. Also the fact that Hall and Fischer had competition between them for the clients and Hall’s 3 clients had already turned back while Fischer’s entire team was marching towards the summit might have forced him not to turnaround. Same mistake was made by Fischer and he too perished. If there was anyone who was guilty for not adhering to the turnaround time he had been speaking about, it was Hall and Fischer, not Boukreev.
4. Each and every client from Fischer’s team had made safely back to the South Cole except Fischer himself. Where as for Hall’s team, Hall, Hansen, Namba and Harris were lost. Hall and Hansen’s death was clear cut responsibility of Hall’s push for the summit. Harris was lost on the South Summit again in a bid to rescue the two. For these 3 deathe Boukreev can not be held responsible at all. Namba was the only client who was lost neat South Cole camp. She was exhausted to the extent of unable to move and could not be rescued by her own team members and Boukreev as well who had risked his life to save 3 stranded climbers. When Boukreev was mounting rescue attempt, Krakauer was asleep in his tent refusing to participate in any rescue attempt. Neither Mike Groom who was from Namba’s team made any attempt as well. It was Stuart Hutchinson who launched the search attempt but her condition had way to much deteriorated by that time.
5. Krakauer himself had passed Beck Weathers and had chosen not to force him down with himself after Weathers informed him about his snow-blindness. In Krakauer’s own account he said he was secretly relieved by Beck’s denial to descend with him. This clearly indicates that Krakauer was afraid if Beck may accept his proposal and descend with him.
6. Was Boukreev responsible for getting down members of Krakauer’s team ? Not surely as Krakauer’s team had 3 guides as well as Boukreev’s. It was error in judgment of Hall that caused deaths of Hall, Hansen and Harris. Fischer was responsible for his own downfall. Boukreev had saved 3 members of his team by going out in blizzard which was his duty as a guide and he stood firm by that.
Considering this, Krakuer just wanted someone to blame for his team’s inability to save themselves and just didn’t want to put the blame on Hall for error in judgment and Fischer, perhaps because he was from Seattle as Krakauer was. In my opinion Boukreev did what was required in that situation and should not have any guilt or lack of responsibility. If at all any guilt and lack of responsibility is there it is on part of Krakauer which was evident in manner in which he reacted on Boukeerv’s book.
South Col not South Cole..
Nice post Cliffhanger. I’ve been trying to say basically the same thing you said in all my posts. Hopefully, your efficient presentation of the facts will get through to the Krakauer supporters! I agree with you 100%
How interesting that you were fortunate enough to meet Anatoli! And good luck to you in your future expeditions!
I read both books while backpacking in the winter in the North GA mtns recently. Brrrr. Ensconced in my hammock @ night reading by headlamp added to the experience. I read Krakauer’s book first followed by “The Climb”. These were the first two mountaneering books I’ve ever read and I am NO mountaineer.
I am puzzled why there is even a debate about this. It is CLEAR that if Boukreev didn’t descend when he did the whole thing would have turned out much worse. It is CLEAR that Krakauer was in his tent exauhsted.
The fact that after doing all he did he proceeded almost all the way up to confirm his friend Scott’s death confirms what a freak of mountaineering nature Boukreev is.
I cried when I read Boukreev went on to solo summit Lhotse in a record time immediately following the climb to deal with his own guilt and turmoil over what happened. I am sure the “What if’s” plagued him the whole way up.
The fact is that these paid guides are there to help you acclimate safely, trek with you repeatedly up and down the mountain on trips to camp 1,2, and three to help you get your “mountain legs”. Once into the death zone…your ass is on your own. Let me repeat that. Once above 8000m YOUR ASS IS ON YOUR OWN. I’m sure Krakauer knew this before his summit attempt. I mean really? All these guides and clients live in close quarters, socialize, party, poop and just generally congregate and gossip for weeks during this process. The YOUR ASS IS ON YOUR OWN concept is proved by the # of bodies that litter Everest.
I do understand how the YOUR ASS IS ON YOUR OWN way of looking at this tragedy might be looked upon as harsh by armchair readers of stories like me. However I suspect, if polled, 100% of the people who have made this trek to the top of the world would agree that I have summed it up accurately. If you get into trouble and someone is brave enough to risk their lives to go rescue you, then that is a selfless bonus on the act of the rescuer. It is not required or expected though, paid guide or not.
Simply put, Bourkeev is a hero and world class athlete. Krakauer was a paid jounalist there to write a story for profit.
I lay no blame on Kraukauer for collapsing in his tent from exauhstion and not helping save lives. I would also lay no blame on Boukreev if he did the same thing…because remember…YOUR ASS IS ON YOUR OWN!!!
Except, when you pay someone $65,000 to be a GUIDE, you are paying that so that your ASS IS NOT ON YOUR OWN!
Again: I don’t see any reasonable person, including JK, blaming AB. I see JK’s observations this way: he thought AB’s behavior was odd; it was little more than a footnote in the book. JK then describes AB’s heroism. What is the problem?
For what it’s worth, I just finished reading the book by Krakauer and I did not even notice there was all this ‘blame’ put on Boukreev, or that he was portrayed in any specifically ‘bad’ light, in fact, it seems to me Krakauer goes on a lot about his own sense of guilt, and if any blame is given it’s about how climing Everest has become a commercial enterprise and how the competition may increase the ambition and drive to ‘summit’, but, in the end, the book seems to me to be VERY clear that even with all the considerations or analyses after the facts, climing Everest is *as such* a highly dangerous endeavour where any number of things go wrong, not least the weather, and the high altitude makes everyone less capable of the kind of ‘sound judgement’ one could expect to have in normal life. Which all makes sense…
I mean you could quote verbatim from the last pages, that if anything is the one ‘point’ Krakauer seems to be making, aside from the telling of the story – at least to me, as a non-expert ordinary reader, I didn’t get all this nastiness in the book towards anyone really. I don’t see why one should be ‘right’ or the other ‘wrong’ because I don’t see the bone of contention here… I understand Boukreev wanted to tell his own story and I have yet to read his account, but from reading Krakauer’s alone I really did not get any such strong unfavourable impression of him at all.
Ps – in fact, only by googling info about the book and its author did I learn that there seemed to be some controversy over how Boukreev was ‘blamed’ in the book, I never got that from the book itself…
To me it seems a lot of people’s actions are described with the author’s own speculation over what maybe could have been a ‘mistake’ or could have been avoided – he’s telling a story, about a very sad tragedy, of humans pushing themselves against any limits and against nature itself, it’s someone anyone can relate to – but it seems to me the author keeps making it very clear, and clarifies again in the concluding pages, that there was NO such thing as individual blame for the whole disaster. I really just finished the book and I still have in my mind the images of the awful physical conditions humans get into at that altitude, with that physical and mental strain, to me it’s a wonder anyone manages to get through alive at all… I wouldn’t even *dream* of judging anyone involved, and it seemed to me Krakauer does a good job of conveying that to the ‘layman’ reader – the idea you simply cannot expect things to go smoothly or sanely when the context itself is that insane (the very fact of climbing Everest is – admirable as it may be, romantic, heroic, epic, whatever you want to call it – but a totally insane act by any point of view). Another notion that stays with me after putting down the book is how much of human fate is down to sheer luck, in general. Such extreme circumstances put that really in focus in ways that perhaps ordinary life doesn’t.
So, I don’t know where everyone got the idea the book’s point is to point the finger at any culprits, it’s not what it was about to me at all. I can understand within the mountaineering community individuals may take issue and want to rectify things in order not to have any shadow cast on their own person, but really, that’s their own prerogative, it’s not what any ordinary person reading about such a tragedy would first think of. The story is so touching and impressive because it is so much bigger than ‘who did what wrong’. Even to imagine dying up there alone in a storm… or surviving but at the cost of having your hands amputated… It makes you realise this is such an extreme level of risk, that everyone undertook voluntarily, and everyone is ultimately responsible for that initial choice, to even go up there at all…
I’m a “living room mountaineer” so my word doesn’t count at all, but all the pros say that the death zone is another world where a lot of confusion can happen. So I think that the circumstances of the 1996 tragedy just cannot be judged on a black and white scale. It was a very complex situation with a lot of unforseenable issues. They were humans and they were definitely not in their world! On that night, everybody up there was a victim somehow and I think that everyone of the survivors from Kasischke to Mike agrees with that.
Any attempt to read a manuscript of a horrifying event that personally effected the emotions, thoughts and perceptions of all involved, then judge it is without merit. We do not hear the tone in which Krakauer or Boukreev
spoke. We do not understand the effects of hypoxia as present on the day of their 1996 Everest Summit. That was one day. The exact effects, all timed according to Mother Nature, will never be definitively the same. What inspires we as humans to be judge to an event we played no role in? Or to judge the manner that each individual dealt with the aftermath?
All present for those events, undoubtedly have differing points of view. The sequence of tragedies that unfolded during and after the Everest Climb of 1996 deserves simple respect from we, the readers. We are foolhardy to offer more judgement. Blessings to all individuals affected by those events and what transpired after them.
I am sorry that I did not read all the posts but this article really pissed me off. Nobody who was at Everest 1996 says they can pinpoint the exact problems that led to the disaster but they can only speculate as to what those problems were. Yet you are going to tell us what they were? Weston points out in, “The Climb” that.. “to cite a specific cause would be to promote an omniscience that only Gods, drunks, politicians, and dramatic writers can claim (hey Krakauer)..”
Now I have to admit Into Thin Air is one of the most exciting books I have read, but after reading the Climb you can’t honestly believe his bullshit can you? This is coming from the same guy who says he saw Andy Harris walk off Everest when it turns out it was not Andy Harris… I understand that being that high up on the mountain messes with your head, but if that is the case why pretend you know everything that happened? Krakauer was among the people that went out and saw Yasuko Namba and Beck Weathers and said they both should be left for dead.. Well Beck Weathers walked back to the camp alone Jon.. Good judgement up there. This is coming from the same guy who makes a poor judgement like that, yet can lay blaim on a guy who single handedly saved two people and assisted in saving another.. I know I am rambling and I apologize but people that make statements like those above kind of make me mad. Could things have been done differently, of course they can, but do I blame Anatoli Boukreev for the decisions he made at the time? Not in the slightest. The guy should be recognized as a hero yet a great writer has painted him as a villain, which might end up being his legacy, and that is a tragedy.
Boukreev was indeed awarded the American Alpine Club David A. Sowles Award. It is their highest award for courage. It is also quite a big deal.
JK blamed himself. You would never get the idea he truly criticized AB in the book, unless you were predisposed to thinking so before reading the book in the first place.
> Krakauer was among the people that went out and saw Yasuko
> Namba and Beck Weathers and said they both should be left for dead..
WTF are you talking about? Like someone’s going to get out of their tent and risk their lives to weigh in on whether or not they’re savable?
Why do so many people here insist on making stuff up to support their case?
I have just read “Into Thin Air ” great read. I really can’t comment having not read “The Climb but to say I think the debate in not that Boukreev or Krakauer are not credible but it is like the Politician who to you believe. The human selfishness was incredible. To me the only thing on peoples minds was I have paid and I am going to reach the top and that’s all that counts, IE: Rob Hall not sending back Doug Hansen back when he knew that Doug was clearly in trouble, also why they take so many inexperienced climbers up there is beyond me, that is death looking for a place to happen. Boukreev was a great mountaineer, but as a guide that is questionable in my mind, but I’ll have to read The Climb before I can pass real judgement. Both Boukreev and Krakauer are to be commended for the adventure that they went on.
Two points: One, Krakauer had 100% full oxygen when he wrote the article cum books, and two, his editors certainly should have been held more accountable if one is to cut K slack for falling under journalism’s “in the heat of battle” mistakes happening, thinking.
However, after Krakauer’s all out assult on Greg Mortenson’s book when he has NEVER corrected his own errors from ITA, really says it all.
The man is an asshole, and don’t buy his books. He is a literary ghoul, digging up dead people to the detriment of the dead and their families. There are no Krakauer fans at Chris McCandalless’ house, or the Tilman home. His books have left a bad taste in the families of these poor men who all died under strange and bizarre circumstances.
That is what attracks writer’s like Krakauer, and I can only hope he, too, will find the media gleefully re-examining this older issue and hold his ass to flame, too.
Greg Mortenson is a hero not a fraud. Once again the press are going after the good guy! Why now are they discrediting Greg Mortenson over dates in a book when he has literally moved mountains to bring education to girls in rural Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cut the man a break!! Shame on you for trying to bring down this gentle giant. Jon Krakauer once again bullies the brave. You’d think he’d have learned from his attack on Anatoli. What makes Jon the voice of anything other than envy over other’s accomplishments of courage and selflessness. Jon writes but has accomplished nothing but padding his own bank account. Greg is a hero and will remain one regardless of the phony attacks on his credibility.
Marcia
I’ve stayed up too late reading all these posts! Just finished “The Climb” last night. Read ‘Into Thin Air” over ten years ago; just remember a gripping book. I just don’t get why Krakauer won’t admit when he’s wrong?
For another angle on this issue, I posted my 135 page post “Jon Krakauer’s Credibility Problem” last week (http://www.feralfirefighter.blogspot.com) dealing mostly with Krakauer’s “Where Men Win Glory” book about Pat Tillman (I’ve got a two page summary at the front). He’s hardly one to “throw stones” at Mortenson when he’s also guilty of fudging his story to make himself look better.
Interesting post. I first read Into Thin Air, then The Climb and then Gammelgaard’s book and I think Boukreev’s account makes the most sense. I was actually not happy with Krakauer’s way of singling Boukreev and Lopsang out the most as people who didn’t have others’ interest at heart. He didn’t come straight out and blame them for the disaster, but he insinuated a lot and got quite a lot of facts wrong (and refused to correct them when presented with evidence. How the hell does one defend behaviors like that??).
It is interesting reading the many comments here. I note that the few who come out defending Krakauer like to make blanket dismissal of all who defend Boukreev as AB’s blind worshipers, while at the same time they refuse to address the fact rebuttals and keep insisting that one team’s guide is somehow responsible for other team’s clients. It doesn’t go to only demand objectivity from others and not from yourselves, you know? If Boukreev and other guides could have saved everyone I’m sure they would have, but their primary responsibility laid with their own clients. And get this, Boukreev worked for Mountain Madness and Krakauer was the client of Adventure Consultants. They weren’t even on the same team.
I’d say that the persistent attitude that one can pay $50,000 and expect to be able show up at a mountain like Everest ill prepared and expect to make all sorts of bad decisions and have the guides always bail you out even at the cost of their own lives is one that is at best very naive and unrealistic. I don’t think either Hall’s or Fishers’ outfit advertised such a thing. A guide’s life is worth a lot more than $50,000. It is quite childish to expect to not have to be responsible for one’s own decisions just because one had paid for a mountain guiding service.
Ultimately I’d say that much of the faults should lie on Rob Hall and Doug Hansen. I know they paid with their lives, but that is no excuse because theirs weren’t the only lives that got lost or were very negatively affected that day. Hall should have turned Hansen around at turn around time, and if Hansen refused, he should have put the safety of his other clients and his guides before Hansen’s personal want (‘want’, not ‘need’. He didn’t need to summit. He wanted to. There is a difference) and disengage from him to pay proper attention to his other clients’ need. Instead he thought he was being kind in allowing Hansen to keep going up the mountain very very late and mentally talking himself into having to stick with Hansen as a personal responsibility issue. Well, in doing so he forgot he also had personal responsibility to others on that mountain, too, and to his wife and unborn child in NZ.
Had Boukreev not descended when he did and had he been using O2 on his ascent, there probably would have been 4 more corpses left on that mountain, since there wouldn’t have been any successful rescue attempt that night. I don’t think that Boukreev could have made much different had he gotten himself stuck with the lost group coming down south summit. He’d have been able to move only as fast as the slowest in his group. And there wouldn’t have been any O2 left at camp.
Some folks like to diss him for making the logical decision. In such places like the Dead Zone, the guy who makes logical decisions rather than emotional ones is the guy who can save your life. Sometimes the people who always want to hold your hands are the ones you’ve got to get away from.
Smorg, You write beautifully, and have echoed my thoughts perfectly! Thanks for your sage comments.
Thanks!
)
In 1996 there was blame to go around. The two people that disserve the most blame are Rob and Scott. But they are dead and we need to point fingers else ware. There were no leaders, no communication and LATE summit times. Half those people should have been turned around.
I just finished rading both books. What if find confusing is that jon was co critical of Anatoli and his teams actions, but was not as critical of Rob Halls team, that lost clients and guides. Fischer and his sherpa were the only two casualties of moutain madness. Also when jon k, stuart h, john t,
and mike groom decided that even though yasuko and beck were still breathing and alive they left them out there. But he felt anatoli should have done for his teammates alone what they chose not to do with four of them.
I feel he should have written about the mistakes of his own team and not speculate or critize mountain madness protocol. Anatoli went back for his friend and team leader scott, what did adventure consultants do for rob. Also he returned the following year to properly bury both scott and yasuko. Did Jon do that? Lori
Well, look at it this way: If you’re trying to summit Everest, wouldn’t you want your guide to be on bottled air so he could be the best he could be? Because I know that I would. As a guide, I think it was his responsibility to serve his clients to the best of his ability. I don’t feel that Jon was critizing Anatoli as much as he was questioning his decisions. Even Scott Fischer (and several on his expedition) was/were complaining loudly about Anatoli’s behavior as a guide. Several of the Sherpas blamed him for the horrible outcome. None of the people that questioned Anatoli’s behavior were interviewed for his book. Neil, one of Scott’s guides who wasn’t interviewed for the book has publicly questioned why that was. In his book he was trying to make sense of the tragedy from all angles. He clearly states that his mind wasn’t functioning and areas were sketchy and he relied mostly on notes and interviews with other people. And Jon does praise Anatoli for his heroic actions and credits him for saving lives.
And Jon does question Rob as well. He questions why he didn’t stick with his turn around time and says in an interview (directly quoted) “Rob Hall, for instance, fucked up big time, and he died, and one of his guides and two of his clients died.” See http://www.randomhouse.com/boldtype/0697/krakauer/interview.html for full interview.
Anatoli was an awesome mountaineer for sure. So were Scott Fischer, Rob Hall, and Andy Harris. Notwithstanding, mistakes were made by all.
Also, I just want to point out that Anatoli didn’t go back to specifically bury the bodies. He was there leading an expedition and buried the bodies while he was there out of respect. Which I do applaud. That was decent and am sure very difficult.
The first paragraph is a bit confusing sorry.
I meant to say none of the people who critisized Anatoli were interviewed for The Climb. This was the book Neil was not interviewed for. And in In Thin Air Jon was trying to make sense of the tragedy.
Well i think you all should now read A day to die by Graham Ratcliffe.
This is a book that has been 14 years of painful research by someone who was on the South Col at the time and he can now reveal that the commercial teams of Mountain Madness and Adventure consultants both had up to date accurate weather forecasts, they knew the storm was going to hit yet they put commercial competition before client safety and went anyway. Nobody else has had the nerve to reveal this certainly not K who would have known
You all seem like you know it all,not even being there at the time. How can anyone know for sure what was actually going through anyone’s mind; or for that matter what B was doing and why? i have read ita and I feel that k is a really brave person to have even gone on this climb. why don’t all you know-it=alls leave all this alone and find some other way to amuse your little pea-brains and get a real life.
callmesuperdave!
I think your tone is a bit abusive, Superdave. The books were written for people who weren’t there. They invite us to imaginatively engage with the events of the tragedy and it’s inevitable that we’ll consider what ifs and might have beens. I think that’s entirely legitimate, because it’s partly by considering alternative ways things might have panned out that you can learn from what did happen.
Thank you Ken, I echo your sentiments. The blog is not about bravery. It’s about honesty and why Jon has treated another climber with such disrespect and rage. It’s a curious thing to wonder why Jon is relentlessly after the hero’s, Anatoli only one of the many.. Greg Mortinson the latest on his hate list of magnificent people who put themselves last to help the forgotten.
I’d love to read Graham Ratcliffe’s account, though my ‘to read’ pile of book is starting to resemble those Himalayan 8,000 meter peakers, so that’s gonna have to wait a while.
I recently read Freddie Wilkinson’s ‘One Mountain, Thousand Summit’ about the K2 disaster of 2006, though, and it struck me that as in the Everest 1996 event the only climbers who were able to rescue others after having reached the summit themselves (in K2 case they were Chhiring Dorje and Pemba Gyalje) were also the only two that climbed without O2 supplement. They, like Boukreev and Lopsang Jambu in 1996, were super fit and very aware of their physiology and preferred to climb w/o O2.
This doesn’t conclusively prove anything, though it is food for thought for those who are so adamant that not using the gas while climbing those 8,000′ers is ‘irresponsible’ or ‘unprofessional’. The only time I’ve read about Boukreev displaying signs of exhaustion during the ’96 event was when he came back from the 1st rescue attempt (where he went up toward S Summit with O2 tanks but couldn’t find anyone and then nearly couldn’t find his way back to the tents). Boukreev used O2 climbing up during that attempt, then stopped using to conserve gas for clients. Krakauer writes that Dr. Hutchinson then found him at the edge of Camp 4 puking his brain out.
I don’t know why Krakauer thinks that Boukreev not having a radio on him meant that he wouldn’t have known if his clients would need more O2 on their descent. Krakauer was way worried about running out of gas himself on the way down because he knew he was only carrying 8 hrs worth of that stuff. Why wouldn’t Boukreev with his years of experience know the same thing?
I think that’s what perplex people who question Krakauer’s treatment of Boukreev in Into Thin Air. He always seems to assume the worst when it comes to AB. Even when he acknowledges AB’s feat of rescuing the climbers, he immediately downplays it by saying that it doesn’t compare to the rescue attempt 2 sherpas did when they tried to reach Rob Hall the following morning. I couldn’t understand that comparison at all. Not to take anything from the genuine heroism of the sherpas, they had a night’s rest and visibilty… and a partner. The man just seems to have it in for the Russian guide somehow.
Thank you Ken for this forum. It sure is fodder for interesting thoughts and opinions.
Hmmm… I have read several accounts, and happened on this blog today.
Remarkably few of the posts (although there are a few) mention what strikes me every time I think about this disaster: everyone, no matter how extraordinarily gifted and/or well-intentioned, is subject to human error, and blaming or second-guessing any one individual in the aftermath of this kind of catastrophe is an exercise in futility, not to mention disrespect.
When you get into a situation where the margin of error is minimal or nonexistent, and humans are making fallible decisions and judgements, disasters happen. The only worthwhile response in the wake is to try and learn from them. I can’t remotely imagine how I would have performed or responded in such a situation, and I’ve been misread often enough in my own life to know that no one can truly understand your own choices and motives except yourself. Many people made mistakes that day, and many people acted with unimaginable heroism. In some cases, people did both. To me Boukreev was an amazing hero, and it seems petty of Krakauer to snipe at him even a little… but every time I start to judge either of them – or any of the other people involved – I realize how arrogant that is. It was pretty brave to put themselves out there by writing publicly about it at all, thus exposing even more of themselves for us to take pot shots at. And maybe we could cut some slack for the PTSD suffered by anyone who survived that climb…
When this event happened, I got into a debate at a dinner party with several people who blamed Hall and Fischer for going on such an expedition at all when they had wives and children at home… which is sort of emblematic to me of the hubris of passing judgement from the sidelines. My opinion in that debate was that it was pretty disrespectful of the wives to assume that they had not made a conscious partnership decision to support their husbands in doing this. That said, if anyone has a right to be angry here, I think it’s them and not us.
Everyone involved was an adult and chose their own path. None of us can read their minds or experiences that day and precious few of us will ever go where they went. How about we all marvel at the heroism that happened, grieve for the losses and tragedies, and hope that we silly humans get better at making decisions about how we interact with our environment and each other?
Amazing how the 1996 tragedy continues to take hold of us -15 years later.
I’ve read both The Climb and Into Thin Air as well as numerous commentaries about the event. Anatoli Boukreev, in my opinion, had personal standards and a climbing philosophy that did not mesh well with the expectations, protocols, and goals of commercial climbing expeditions. He repeatedly spells out different choices that he would have made in The Climb. His rationale and choices appear more sound than either leader’s ideas and choices. And it doesn’t read like Monday morning quarterbacking, either, in that he voiced his opinions and ideas at the time, only to be turned down by his employer. For example, he told Scott that he did not think they should move on from the South Col to this summit because of the weather. Scott did not value his opinion more than his rival’s opinion, however, and did proceed to the summit. Boukreev would have also made sure his teammates rested further down in the forest zone, prior to the summit bid, as he himself did, to build up their reserves. Scott and the climbers, for the most part, did not agree or choose this path.
Perhaps the most significant value he brought to his team was that of “silver bullet.” Those were his employers words. Scott hired him specifically for his exemplary skills to employ in the case of an emergency. Guess what, he more than delivered. He saved the lives of his teammates. How do you argue with this? Apparently the American Alpine Club found that they would not argue with it, and instead awarded him the David A. Sowles Award for his bravery, a pretty big deal in climbing circles.
The “controversy” I find most puzzling is that surrounding Boukreev’s descent from the summit ahead of his team. First, he had his employer’s blessing to do so. Second, his rationale -resting up in case he was needed for an emergency- was completely vindicated as it allowed him to save his fellow climbers’ lives later than night.
I don’t find Anatoli’s strategies and choices hard to understand.
The other thought I’d like to submit is that climbing is fiercely personal and all about personal responsibility for one’s own self and life. While Jon Krakauer appears to be a talented climber (and great story teller) somehow, he misses this most basic element of mountain climbing.
Thank you for recommending Graham Radcliffe’s book ” A DAY TO DIE FOR” which I ordered from the UK. Not available here. It truly answers my questions about the 1996 tragedy and exonerates Anatoli. I think the book was written with great care as Graham was on Everest, at the same camp as Scott and Rob’s teams, in a tent resting on the night of the tragedy. He and his team mates were unaware that head lights they saw in the dark of night in the distance were lost climbers from Rob and Scott’s team needing to be rescued. After the tragedy, feeling numb and guilty that he had not been able to help, he went home. A year later,feeling guilty lead Graham to do exhaustive research over the next 14 years to uncover what he believes to be the truth about what happened. I think the book was very well written with sensitivity. All facts gathered are referenced. All individuals asked for information are listed with their response or lack there of. There is no single blame, but a better understanding. Clearly Jon Krakauer did not do his homework which should have included that the team leaders had and then rejected daily e-mailed and printed weather forecasts of unstable weather. Calling the storm a “rouge storm” was a lie. The team leaders knew of the weather being unstable and passed both the IMAX and Danish teams retreating down because the weather was unstable. Even with two teams leaving and printed weather forecasts daily, Rob and Scott ignored what they saw, including Anatoli’s suggestion to wait it out for better weather. Jon also placed his personal opinion about Anatoli as fact rather than research as Graham did. Graham quotes an article from March 96 of Scott stating that Anatoli would not be using oxygen. Jon did not get it right regarding addressing some of the most basic and obvious issues regarding weather. Even though he experienced the winds and saw the clouds he never questioned his team leaders push to the summit. They call it summit fever. Sounds right. There are only so many days you can stay at certain elevations without oxygen. There are only so many days the weather is good. There are only so many days to working within the permit for climbing. Graham points out the competition between teams to get climbers to the summit to promote their business. Sadly, poor judgement rather than caution ruled the day making decisions regarding weather patterns, condition of routes with fixed ropes, communication between teams, lack of radios, and finally illness clouding the ability to think straight at high altitudes made for a deadly scene.
I’d heard about the animosity between Krakauer & Boukreev before I’d even read either book, & upon picking up ‘Into Thin Air’ first, I was rather surprised to see how little criticism was included. Yes, clearly K had question marks over decisions made by B but he also put him in good light on several occasions. We’ll never know the absolute truth – indeed it may have been lost in the fog of hypoxia, even to the two protagonists, themselves – but if B felt a need, as he clearly did, to put across his version of events on what he considered a mistaken or misinformed viewpoint, then this too seems perfectly reasonable. B might have come across to some as a little overly defensive (MM client Gammelgaard refused to have a bad word said against him).
How things got so utterly inflamed thereafter I’m not sure, but if you want a real villain of the piece, then Ian Woodall fit the bill rather aptly, & perhaps should have warranted a bit more ink. And on the other side of the mountain, the two Japanese who walked past the three dying Indian climbers.
Another excellent (& highly recommended) book is ‘The Death Zone’ by Matt Dickinson; he too was on the north ridge at the time, filming the hefty, hardly-spring chicken, English actor, Brian Blessed in his attempt to summit. He directly contrasts the heroics of those on the south col route with the actions of the duo high on his side, stepping over fellow climbers in dire need.
i believe climbers to be the most selfish ego driven people on earth.you selfish people who want to get to the top and leave the others to sink to the bottom.
I recently re-read both Into Thin Air and The Climb. There is no question Toli was an extremely experienced altitude climber and Jon was along as a journalist looking to profit from the adventure. Toli is gone and I do not believe we will ever know what truly happened. May all those that perished rest in peace.
Please read ” A Day To Die For” by Graham Radcliffe or check above for my review of what I believe the most coherent and factual account of this disaster.
No doubt you have all read this, but for the few that haven’t:
http://classic.mountainzone.com/climbing/fischer/letters.html
When I read “Into Thin Air’ I was struck by how clearly Kraukauer was one of the strongest climbers on the mountain, he was able to pass everyone, he was always first in the queue, always sitting and waiting for everyone to catch up– even impatient with the “slow pace” at times. Yet, when it got late, and people were in trouble, he passed by every person not helping. He passed Beck Weathers, suggesting that Beck wait for the next climbers coming down. When Stuart tried to wake him to bang pots so those only a few hundred feet away could locate the camp, JK did not get up. He was the STRONGEST, yet he attempts to portray himself as if he was the weakest, unable to do anything. I am sure he is having difficulty living with his inaction. There were so many opportunities for him to help and save lives. tragic story.
Finding this discussion fascinating. I’ve read Into Thin Air and The Climb, and i must say that I don’t think Krakauer villainized Boukreev to the extent many feel he did. There was plenty of high praise for Boukreev’s talent throughout the book. Boukreev was paid to be a guide. He did not guide. It’s clear: Boukreev climbed virtually alone that day and descended alone, with no clients. Which is fine, if that was his job. But it wasn’t. He valiantly went out into the storm to find the huddle, and he is to be commended for that. But had he done his job, the huddle may not have happened in the first place.
What Ifs are basically useless, but the truth is had Boukreev descended with clients, even just his OWN clients instead of leaving Neal Beidleman to take care of six clients on his own (never mind the fact that Martin Adams nearly walked off the side of the mountain – and was saved by Mike Groom) it may have changed the outcome significantly. Certainly if there was another guide with the huddle, they all may have gotten down faster and Namba and Weathers might have made it in in one piece. Sadly, we will never know.
Ultimately, the deaths of Hall, Hansen and Harris are fully and sadly on Hall’s shoulders, and Fischer’s on Fischer’s. But to say Boukreev made good decisions and was beyond reproach that day is sadly incorrect. Nobody made good decisions that day, and everyone paid for it – some more than others.
I saw the comment above about people seeming to choose a “side” based on which book they read first, but I certainly didn’t follow that pattern. I just finished reading “Into Thin Air”, before which I had heard of none of these people, and I came away from the book wondering why the author is so nasty about this Boukreev guy. A quick webseach made me realize I wasn’t the only one asking that question.
If you read “Into Thin Air” uncritically, you might go along with the author’s assertion that he is just trying to get the facts as straight as possible. If you pay any attention at all though, it becomes clear quite quickly that there are discrepancies in how he treats some people verbally and narratively compared to how he treats others. Some of the easier examples to spot are sentences of the sort where he lists all the white people by name and concludes with, “and six Sherpas”. The implication of such a sentence, which Krakauer as a professional writer would know all too well, is that the white folks are distinct individuals and it matters to know which ones are being discussed, but the Sherpas are an indistinct mass and which ones were there is an unimportant detail. If Krakauer didn’t wasn’t sure of such details when he went to press, it is a very easy thing to note in the text or a footnote that which six Sherpas were present was unknown at the time of writing. Again, as a professional writer, Krakauer would know that this would change the implication from, “It doesn’t matter which Sherpas, but it sure matters which white people,” to, “It matters which people were there, but I have incomplete information.”
There is a particularly funny example of this sort of linguistic disappearing when he says the Adventure Consultants camp is home to “fourteen Westerners…and fourteen Sherpas.” Evidently Yasuko Namba just stood outside the whole time?
There is a more complex but equally distinct disparity in the verbal treatment Krakauer gives Beck Weathers versus Sandy Pittman. If you pick the basic facts out of his narrative, they are fundamentally very similar — both are rich Americans indulging a Seven Summits quest to the detriment of their families, both are obnoxiously overbearing personalities who insist on their own way and on dominating conversations. But when Krakauer spends time developing their characters, the discrepancy in language shows up again. Pittman likes to “dabble in outdoor pursuits”, while Krakauer wants to make sure that we know Weathers is “not frivolous”, but “deadly serious”. He doesn’t give a reason why he assesses two people doing the exact same thing so differently, but it should be enough to make any critical reader realize that what they’re getting is an account dripping with personal bias.
Even so, Krakauer really had me going with his condemnation of Boukreev. He takes the time halfway through the book to establish a Boukreev-”shirking his responsibilities” narrative arc (Krakauer’s wording, not mine). His arguments seemed compelling enough: 1. While he says Boukreev was adhering to good alpine principles as he knew them, he was flat-out refusing to do as his employer told him, and 2. He ascended the icefall as the “sweep” far behind the slowest of the group, instead of with the slowest of the group, lingering to rest, take a shower, and so on.
Having this established as Boukreev’s character ahead of time lends narrative weight to assertions later on that Boukreev was shirking again on summit day, by climbing without supplemental oxygen, by discarding his pack most of the way up, by descending “early” so as to be back in the tents resting while his clients face peril. Krakauer makes such a thorough job of insisting that Boukreev was shirking that it brought me up short when Bourkeev plunged into a high-velocity whiteout in the unlikely hope that he could find people to help. Even more startling, he then came back and did it three more times, bringing back three people. Krakauer rightly calls this behavior heroic, but sticks to his “shirking” interpretation of Boukreev’s earlier behavior at the same time.
At this point it seemed to me that Krakauer was no longer making any sense. Four solo rescue sorties in a high-velocity whiteout is not the behavior of a shirker, especially when having climbed above Camp IV was apparently reason enough to be too weak to attempt even one. Boukreev’s behavior is not consistent with the “shirker” theory, but it is consistent with someone who is carefully hoarding their strength to use it in an emergency. That Boukreev was able to come up with the physical reserves that he did suggests an extremely expert knowledge of exactly what he was capable of and what he wasn’t. Maybe all people would maintain their strength better by carrying the weight of oxygen tanks and breathing supplemental oxygen at those altitudes. Then again, maybe Boukreev was telling the truth, and that for a very few people with the right adaptations, skipping the O2, the weight, and moving expeditiously does a better job of leaving energy in reserve for later. That Krakauer refuses to consider that the evidence suggests that Boukreev was correct about his own capabilities makes Krakauer come across as having some kind of ax to grind.
However, if Krakauer treated all mistakes or maybe-mistakes similarly in the word choices he uses, the narrative placement he gives them, and the amount of text expended, he would at least come across as trying to present a truthful account. But he doesn’t. There’s a startling contrast in how he presents Weather’s repeated decisions to keep going with ever-worsening eyesight versus what he regards as Boukreev’s mistakes. Again, the Boukreev-is-a-shirker theme is set up as a narrative arc ahead of time so that it is already established by the time the story gets to summit day. But while Weathers’ failing eyesight, which gets worth with every increase in altitude, is a known problem since base camp, it is kept hidden from the narrative until Weathers is on the Balcony. This structural trick makes it seem like Weathers’ problem wasn’t fundamentally different from the sudden-onset symptoms other climbers struggled with that day, when in fact it was quite predictable. Weathers didn’t climb as far as he could go while still being able to bring himself back — he deliberately chose to climb as far as he could go, period, assuming it was the job of everyone around him to then rescue him from his own folly, and he was making these choices ahead of time at lower altitude, so he doesn’t even have the hypoxic-reasoning excuse. I don’t have a problem with Krakauer glossing over that ugly reality given the terrible things that happened to Weathers, if only Krakauer would give others equal grace. But the rescuer-of-others gets the opposite narrative treatment, with a significant amount of text and narrative structure devoted to making sure we know Boukreev Did Wrong.
It’s downright weird, really.
Well don’t forget the glossing over of all the bad decisions made by Rob Hall that were much more detrimental to everyone than any “alleged” bad decisions made by Anatoli. You will note Kraukauer was extremely critical of members of the Mountain Madness team but didn’t have any criticism of any of the Adventure Consultants team. He has no journalistic integrity in this matter at all. And I really like your post. It is very intelligent.
There are a lot of textual oddities in how Krakauer deals with the violation of turnaround time. He makes it clear that it’s bad and that the two expedition leaders did not fulfill their responsibility to tell people to turn around.
But he cites Boukreev’s actually obeying the turnaround time as Boukreev doing something wrong. This is weird. Krakauer reports that Boukreev expressed concern over the time violations, but he brushes this off instead of saying, “Hey, at least one guide above Camp IV had the sense to do this.”
Since there is no way to force anyone to turn around at that altitude, I’m not sure what more you can do other than remind people and set the correct example, which is exactly what Boukreev did. When one of the toughest climbers in existence decides it’s time to get the hell off that peak, it sends a powerful message, though obviously not powerful enough to those who don’t want to listen.
I’m glad you liked my post. There are plenty more textual oddities in the book, but I mainly just wanted to give enough examples to show why, even though I had never heard of any of these people before, I got to the end of the book wondering what Krakauer’s problem is in general and with Boukreev in particular. I suspect those who pointed out that he targeted those least able to respond in the American press were correct, though there seems to be more to it than that.
Thank you to everyone who provided additional reading suggestions above. Krakauer’s book was enough of an exercise in sorting the facts out of the narrative from all the window-dressing that I’m now curious to read the other accounts.
It seems to me most people here did not read the addendums of JK in the second version of the book (where JK writes more about AB’s biography) and also did not check with other resources. If you do, you will see that many of the things DeWalt stated in The Climb were denied by the people concerned or cited (for example Beidleman).
JK never disputed AB to be a hero, but simply questioned some of the choices AB took in 1996; not based on his own opinion, but based on statements by other world class climbers (for example Viestur but also Messner, – DeWalt missquoted Messners words).
Into Thin Air is not about blaming someone but looking for the many causes that led to the dramatic ending and I think that JK did it, also in a fair and objective way. JK recognizes his own faults, also questions certain decisions by Hall and Fisher and I do not see where the problem is in recognizing that also AB, one of the greatest mountain climbers and who prooved to be a hero in that situation could have made some mistakes (climbing is different from guiding and infact when he guided after 1996 AB would use oxygen).
I think JK he went a little harsh on AB, maybe because he didn’t like the fact that AB would not even accept the possibility that any of his decisions could not have been the best (eventhough JK mentions that in that particular situation of stress due to the altitude decision making is impaired).
Moro, a good friend of AB told JK he did not understand AB enoguh well and maybe he was right and so, what initially was a simple observation became a huge personality clash.
I think to remember also that before AB died he met with JK and that they more or less agreed to disagreee and stopped fighting.
A bit late to the party here, but I think Wendy’s desire (among others) to knock Rob Hall doesn’t begin to take into account the situation Hall was facing with Hansen, nor does it take into account the fact that Hall’s other guide Andy Harris was clearly suffering from some form of altitude sickness – something that Krakauer, who was face to face with the guy, didn’t fully comprehend until after the tragedy (and which he carries considerable feelings of guilt for).
As far as Hall knew, he had two guides and Sherpas stationed further down the mountain who were capable of taking care of the rest of the team if necessary. Hansen cuts a particularly tragic figure, having been divorced by his wife in the wake of his first aborted attempt and worked two jobs in order to raise the funds for a second attempt, this despite the fact that Hall had personally arranged a discounted price for him to go again. At that point in his life, Everest was all that Hansen was living for. Call it illogical, call it out of character, but you’d have to have had a heart of stone to deny him if you were in Hall’s shoes.
Another thing that doesn’t seem to be accounted for in a lot of these replies is that the 2pm turnaround time applied to Hall’s team only. Fischer’s team had no such hard-and-fast limits and I’m sure that having been delayed at the bottlenecks, Hall would have realised that to have his team turn around within walking distance of the summit while they watched Fischer’s team continue on to reach their goal would lead to bitter recriminations once they returned to camp. Hall trusted in his abilities to get Hansen to the top, tag it, then turn around while the rest of his team were being handled by the guides on their way down. He could have had no idea that one of his guides, Andy Harris, was already in trouble even before the storm came, and indeed I seem to recall that Harris’s dogged insistence that the oxygen cache at the South Summit was empty – when in fact it wasn’t – meant that Hall was never aware of the option to tie Hansen to the rope, descend for more oxygen and return. Such an action may not have saved Hansen, but if a full bottle of oxygen did not revive him, it’s possible that Hall may have realised there was little more he could do for him.
Also, the decision for both teams to go together meant that a degree of resource-pooling as it applied to guides and Sherpas was expected. I get the impression that Hall’s team were willing to help Fischer’s clients and vice versa. The decision made sense in a lot of ways, but while there was an informal pooling of resources and indeed cameraderie between the two teams, Hall and Fischer still retained their distinctive approaches to leadership – and when the delays began to bite on the way to the summit, this began to cause operational difficulties. I’ve mentioned Hall having to face a significant Hobson’s Choice regarding the turnaround time, but this was complicated by Fischer’s habit of bringing up the rear and compounded even further by the fact that Fischer himself was struggling, significantly behind Hall and Hansen. Had Fischer been present then a joint decision could have been made to turn both teams around or continue on, but while there was an unresolved element of competition between the teams, the temptation to let the ends justify the means must have been very strong.
It appears that just as tempting is the desire to lay some kind of blame somewhere, but this doesn’t get us anywhere. Ultimately an attempt was made to summit Everest and return, and decisions made by a whole host of people – almost all of them understandable even if, with 20/20 hindsight, they turned to be unwise – led to the deaths on the mountain, including those of the two team leaders.
Global Warming, El Niño, and High-Impact Storms at Extreme Altitude: Historical Trends and Consequences for Mountaineers Moore, G. W. K., J. L. Semple, G. Hoyland, 2011: Global Warming, El Niño, and High-Impact Storms at Extreme Altitude: Historical Trends and Consequences for Mountaineers. J. Appl. Meteor. Climatol., 50, 2197–2209.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JAMC-D-11-023.1
Link to an abstract hypothesizing that the storm lowered barometric pressure which might make the hypoxia even worse.
Its amazing that after almost 16 years these events still hold our attention.
After reading Into Thin Air I didn’t feel Krakauer overly focussed on Boukreev as the culprit. It seems to me that he needed someone to blame for the tragedy and felt it would be disrespectful or insensitive to blame either Fischer or in particular Hall as he had left a heavily pregnant wife. In my opinion the two leaders were to blame as if they obeyed the turnaround time the tragedy may have been averted.
I also think Krakauer’s presence as a journalist on the mountain contributed indirectly to the crisis. Beck Weathers confirmed that Rob Hall felt a particular pressure to succeed as the whole expedition would be recorded and red by millions in Outside magazine. Imagine the bad publicity Hall would receive if Fischer reached the top while he was forced to turn back.
I found Into Thin Air to be written powerfully and vividly however there were some factors I found a little tedious. One was Krakauer constantly telling us how brilliant he was at climbing, there must have been a dozen or so occasions where he mentioned how he was “2 or more hours in front of the group” even when it has absolutely no relevance. The second problem I had with the book was the postscript. It seemed to deviate from the story of the diaster and turned into a pissing contest between Krakauer and DeWalt, the co author of The Climb, where Krakauer seemed determined to score as many cheap points as he could
First of all, I don’t think Krakauer hated Boukreev, but he did call Boukreev’s judgment into question. According to Krakauer, Boukreev deviated in several ways from what was considered standard procedure for a guide.
Secondly, Boukreev’s prowess as a high altitude climber is totally irrelevant, and I find it strange that many folks who posted here seem to think that is a justification for defending him. Boukreev was hired as a guide and according to Krakauer’s version of events Boukreev did a damn poor job of fulfilling the duties of a guide. Heck, there were climbers present who did not have half the mountaineering skills that Boukreev had, but at least they were around to actually help Boukreev’s clients down off the ridges and onto the South Col, while Boukreev was apparently sitting in his tent drinking tea.
Boukreev may have represented the epitome of a great climber, but I don’t understand why he would skedaddle back to camp and leave his clients to fend for themselves — they paid for his guiding services and he wasn’t there when they needed him!
You did not read Boukreev’s book, did you?
I believe that Graham Ratcliffe’s recent well-researched and comprehensive “A Day to Die for” (2011) should be added to the discussion. It does contribute some facts and personal evaluations and insights concerning B and other key figures on the mountain on May 10-11.
Was Boukreev at his best sans oxygen? ‘Sans oxygen’ sounds like a badge of honor for the hardcore mountaineers. “oh you climbed… well i climbed without oxygen!’ A badge of honor that you seek out on your own dime. When you’re guiding on someone else’s dime, do what you can to ensure that you are at your best physically. Sounds like Boukreev struggled without oxygen, leading him to make questionable decisions
Actually the only time I’ve read about Boukreev having any sort of ‘struggle’ was after his first rescue attempt. He used O2 for the first time to ‘accelerate’ his climb up to where he thought the lost climbers were, then took off the O2 because he needed to conserve it for client use (there was O2 shortage there. The climbers were very late and all ran out of gas both figuratively and literally. That some more usable canisters were found later doesn’t retroactively relieve the real time shortage)… and that was the first time anyone described him as showing any sort of suffering (Dr. Hutchinson reportedly found him gasping and vomiting at the edge of Camp V then).
It seems to me people seems stuck on this Boukreev not using O2 as a sign of irresponsibility or misprioritization (valuing his macho image over clients safety). I wonder about his physiology. The man was very aware of his own physical condition. He had used O2 before, but seemed to prefer to go without because he thought O2 use would mask physical symptoms that he wanted to always be aware of. Perhaps he really performed better without the gas than he did. Not everyone has the same physiology. It’s similar to many cycling enthusiasts’ criticism of Jan Ullrich for using bigger gear and lower cadence than most other professional cyclists when climbing the big mountains, but his physique (very muscular) was quite different from the others (skinny as sticks), and his own way of climbing was probably best for him (after all, he only ever lost to Lance Armstrong and Marco Pantani in the mountains).
And the fact remains that of the summiteers that year, the only ones that were still physically capable of attempting rescue were Boukreev and Lopsang Jambu — both climbed without supplemental O2 (the same sort of thing happened on K2 nearly 10 yrs later… only the super-fit and alert pros that climbed and summitted without O2 were capable of rescuing others after things went awry.
I’m not advocating O2-free climbing at high altitude. I’m questioning this persistent over-emphasis on O2 usage and the supposed ‘safety’ it provides. It seems to me Boukreev’s abstinent was well reasoned (don’t forget that he requested that he be allotted O2 supply even though he didn’t use it until he started having to rescue others. Had he not done that there would have been 2 or 3 canisters fewer available on the mountain… and probably none to revive the lost climbers who had used up their own supply before getting back to camp). In the mountain you only move as fast as the slowest in your group. Chances are good that had he stayed with the climbers he’d be stuck with them in the white out rather than being in camp and capable of rescue attempts.
If Krakauer, who was inexperienced at climbing at that altitude and was perhaps the fastest to return to Camp 4, knew he was gonna run out of O2, surely Boukreev, who made a living climbing at that altitude, knew that his much slower moving clients would. The dude had a degree in physics and O2 consumption rate is only a simple calculation.
Boukreev is clear in his reasoning in every reference to not using oxygen in his book. His belief was that if you are dependent on oxygen while climbing and then you run out, your bodies’ physical response to the stress can put you in danger.
He is not alone in this philosophy. His choice to not use oxygen, to me, had nothing to do with attaining a badge of honor and everything to do with responsible climbing.
So far in my life I don’t knowingly engage in highly dangerous endeavors due to knowing I would feel irresponsible because I have a family that depends on me … but I’m fascinated by people who do (mountaineering, deep sea diving, hanggliding, etc.) – things I told my life insurance company I had no plans to do when I took out the policy.
It seems to me anyone who does these things knows they take their life into their own hands and they do so willingly knowing the risks – who didn’t know the risks on Everest in ’96? They all did. Paying for a guide may reduce the risk, but little more, they all still took their own lives into their own hands. Many of the climbers during that season turned back before summitting (including the guy who rode his bike from Sweden who did actually summit a few days later after his first attempt came up short slightly below summit). Everyone who died did at some point actively make the choice to keep going when they shouldn’t have (easy for us to see in the safety of our armchair anyway). Beck didn’t die but as far as I could tell, he’s the only one who was following his leader’s orders to his own detriment, pity his leader seemed to have completely forgotten about him in the thin air up there. But again, he chose to stay in a dangerous place for far too long when he could have descended earlier with someone else who really knew what they were doing. Obviously if he had been able to think clearly under those conditions and/or known the trouble Hall was in, his story would have ended better.
According to experts who were on the mountain in ’96 such as Viesturs and Adams, Boukreev carried one O2 tank “just in case” which he ended up giving away. The one thing that to me cannot be refuted by anyone is that Boukreev had the talent, experience, intelligence under duress, strength and courage that so many others we’re discussing lacked on that day. The language barrier is unfortunate and the one thing I wish I knew is why he breathed bottled O2 on at least one subsequent climb while guiding – that is the only thing that makes me scratch my head about him. But honestly, I give him the benefit of the doubt; clearly there was a shortage of O2 during the disasterous hours on Everest in ’96 and he was by far the strongest person on the mountain even without using any of the short supply, I don’t see how anyone could fault his judgment. He appears to be the only climber of the bunch who fully understood and actually practiced hiking down to a much lower point on the mountain (even into the woods) during the acclimatizing process after a new ascent in order to build and preserve solid long-term strength. In contrast to everyone else, he was actually for days/weeks preparing for any potential disaster scenario and performed heroically when needed (again even after sumitting without O2).
Furthermore, Boukreev and Fischer were tight partners on at least one high summit climb prior to the Everest ’96 disaster. I believe they knew each other well and shared great respect for and trust in each other. Regardless of whatever “plans” there may or may not have been that day, second-guessing Boukreev is simply second-guessing a hero who put his life on the line when it mattered most (i.e. when a real known emergency was evident) and saved multiple lives in the process. I don’t think anyone on his team has been critical of his actions in any meaningful way, that’s a pretty important point to me. And most notable is that Martin Adams fully sides with Boukreev even while admitting he likes JK’s writing (Adams is the climber JK claims was essentially abandoned by Boukreev yet Adams himself totally defends Boukreev).
Also I’ll say that when reading JK’s book, I didn’t detect too much negativity towards Boukreev (especially compared to Woodall) until the appended material at the end. Clearly both got very emotional over the thing (I’m sure we all would in their shoes). Lastly, I have to say I naturally discount the position of the writer who admits to using pot in his book – you lack good judgment. For one thing, impressionable young readers who read after you may be less inclined to resist when offered opportunities to enter that “gateway” knowing that you see it as acceptable (no small wonder you saw things that later you realized couldn’t have been possible when faced with the facts).
One tends to agree with the above, especially after reading Graham Ratcliff’s (recent) balanced and very detaled book. (Credible, even though he had been a good friend of Boukreev with whom he had previously summitted Everest from the North Side route).
Anatoli addressed the reason he used oxygen in a later climb in his book: The Climb. He recently had surgery, if memory serves, and he did not know how he might be affected while climbing.
In other words, his choice to use oxygen at that time is another example of responsible behavior on his part.
Being a rock climber for 16 years, mountaineer for 12 and ski mountaineer who relishes the treasures found in the Cascades and Olympics I hold the late Anatoli as my idol and role model. Krakauer is a joke; undisciplined and a fantastic author, I would NEVER climb with him. His captivating writing simultaneously presents the inexperience of Krakauer – just another dip$hit that gets guided to the top of a mountain…far from the spirit of a true mountaineer. Above The Clouds, although not as gripping as Into Thin Air displays the immense reverence and experience that Anatoli carried into the mountains every trip. I hope Krakauer reads this and weeps in the understanding that his name holds absolutely NO respect in the mountaineering community, especially for those of us who anonymously and avidly scale these peaks for the reasons Anatoli so eloquently states, “Mountains are not stadiums where I satisfy my ambition to achieve, they are the cathedrals where I practice my religion.”
Scott, thank you for your beautiful insightful words. I couldn’t agree more with your assessment of Jon.
Marcia
Well said, Scott. Thanks. For me JK has no respect even as an author; he may write well but I will never ever buy his books. Its simply a matter of trust.
Thanks Operasmorg for making the point on supplemental o2 masking physical symptoms. If Toli had not followed plans, if he had used supp o2 we would have had more casualties that day.
God bless.
Hello everybody!
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This is one of the cases when reading comments is same or even more interesting than the post itself (no offence, author
Anyways, I am happy to see so many people writing good comments on Anatoli, all these people who can see what’s true and what’s not.
I believe that to call Krakauer a dung beetle would be an insult to all the dung beetles on the planet.
“Hatred of the good for being the good means hatred of that which one regards as good by one’s own (conscious or subconscious) judgment. It means hatred of a person for possessing a value or virtue one regards as desirable.
If a child wants to get good grades in school, but is unable or unwilling to achieve them and begins to hate the children who do, that is hatred of the good. If a man regards intelligence as a value, but is troubled by self-doubt and begins to hate the men he judges to be intelligent, that is hatred of the good.” -Ayn Rand
The facts appear to show that Boukreev was a hero and his actions that day were heroic. At least subconsciously, Krakauer almost certainly admired the heroism displayed by Boukreev. However, Krakauer’s less than heroic actions that day (his abandonment of Beck Weathers) sit in stark contrast to Boukreev ‘s. Krakauer’s failure to perform heroically (when others had done so) along with the shame he necessarily felt, likely threatened his ego. Sadly, his response was to turn the true hero of that day into a villain by projecting what he must have percieved as a moral failure onto Boukreev .
Through his writing, Krakauer has attempted to hide a minor sin by committing a deadly one. Krakauer’s failure on the mountain that day was forgivable. His attack on Boukreev is not.
The “facts” show that Boukreev was a guide who didn’t guide, who was in his tent drinking tea while clients were still trying to make their way down the mountain. His actions to go back into the storm saved lives, there is no question, but that was his job. And if he had done his job earlier in the day, the rescue might not have been necessary. Yes, Krakauer saved his own ass. He was a client and was not professionally beholden to look out for other people. That was Boukreev’s job, a job which by all accounts he sucked at til it was almost too late.